

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FOR MOOTW:
AN ANALYSIS OF TACTICAL LESSONS
LEARNED**

by

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June 2000

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DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE June 2000	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FOR MOOTW: AN ANALYSIS OF TACTICAL LESSONS LEARNED		5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S) Jason G. Adkinson				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE		
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines tactical lessons learned from recent military operations other than war (MOOTW) for implications on leadership development for junior leaders in the United States Marine Corps. A doctrinal examination of MOOTW provides the context for the study. The research questions focus on unique leadership capabilities and competencies necessary for junior Marine Corps leaders in the MOOTW environment. The research involved analysis of recent tactical experiential lessons. These tactical lessons learned, coupled with the doctrinal examination, result in MOOTW specific junior leader competencies necessary for MOOTW organizational effectiveness. The results synthesize into three key competency areas: (1) ability to adapt leadership roles to diverse environments, (2) independent decision-making skills for decentralized operations, and (3) ability to develop leadership skills in team members. Theoretical leadership development frameworks are reviewed for insight into improving these junior leader competencies in the Marine Corps. Recommendations include focusing MOOTW training on the characteristics of: (1) highly politicized environment at all levels of command, (2) high ambiguity between combatants and non-combatants, (3) decision-making at the lowest tactical levels in a decentralized environment, (4) development of teams to operate autonomously in this decentralized environment, and (5) reinforcement that tactical decisions by junior leaders have operational and even strategic impact.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Leadership Development For MOOTW			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 134	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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OF TACTICAL LESSONS LEARNED**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of


**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT**

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 2000

Author:




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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines tactical lessons learned from recent military operations other than war (MOOTW) for implications on leadership development for junior leaders in the United States Marine Corps. A doctrinal examination of MOOTW provides the context for the study. The research questions focus on unique leadership capabilities and competencies necessary for junior Marine Corps leaders in the MOOTW environment. The research involved analysis of recent tactical experiential lessons. These tactical lessons learned, coupled with the doctrinal examination, result in MOOTW specific junior leader competencies necessary for MOOTW organizational effectiveness. The results synthesize into three key competency areas: (1) ability to adapt leadership roles to diverse environments, (2) independent decision-making skills for decentralized operations, and (3) ability to develop leadership skills in team members. Theoretical leadership development frameworks are reviewed for insight into improving these junior leader competencies in the Marine Corps. Recommendations include focusing MOOTW training on the characteristics of: (1) highly politicized environment at all levels of command, (2) high ambiguity between combatants and non-combatants, (3) decision-making at the lowest tactical levels in a decentralized environment, (4) development of teams to operate autonomously in this decentralized environment, and (5) reinforcement that tactical decisions by junior leaders have operational and even strategic impact.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

The U.S. military has always trained to be ready to fight the nation's wars in defense of American interests. With the collapse of the Soviet threat, the armed forces have undergone significant change in structure and mission focus while continuing to be prepared to defend U.S. interests in large-scale combat operations. The dissolution of the Soviet empire has in many ways placed new and unexpected challenges on the U.S. military in the form of smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations, or military operations other than war (MOOTW).

These operations, which have been characteristic of post-Cold War military intervention, include all types of military employment short of major theater warfare. MOOTW have been defined by Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, as: "operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war." (p. I-1)

Such smaller-scale contingency operations include: show-of-force operations, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, no-fly zone enforcement, peace enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, counterterrorism operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. These mission types have been the experience of American military forces throughout the past decade. The prospects of the frequency of these MOOTW diminishing in the near future are slim.

The Department of Defense (DOD) Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

(1997) illustrates this prospect:

Based on recent experience and intelligence projections, the demand for smaller-scale contingency operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years...These operations will still likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces through 2015 and may require significant commitments of forces, both active and reserve. Over time, substantial commitments to multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations will certainly stress U.S. forces in ways that must be carefully managed. (Section III)

The frequency and diversity of these operations require preparation on the part of all defense agencies to meet the challenges of future military operations other than war. The United States Marine Corps, as the nation's "911 force," must be on the cutting edge in preparing Marines for mission success in this operational environment.

B. BACKGROUND

Marine Corps leadership concurs with the QDR assessment of the predominant use of military forces for the foreseeable future and recognizes the unique challenges of military operations other than war. The Marine Corps, while maintaining traditional warfighting capabilities, now sees itself preparing for what General Krulak (1999), then Commandant, termed "the three-block war -- contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks." (*Marines*, p. 4) Such a war requires that Marines be prepared to distribute relief aid, separate rival tribal or ethnic factions, and conduct full-scale combat operations all within these three city blocks.

This is the metaphor the Marine leadership uses to describe the burdens placed upon Marines in the face of the new threats to American interests abroad. Such missions

differ in sometimes subtle and at other times profound ways from the “traditional” warfighting missions assigned to the United States Marine Corps over its history. These differences require a constant assessment of the capabilities of the service to continue its record of success across the spectrum of conflict. In no area is this self-assessment more important than in the development of the small-unit leaders who are key to successful operations in the uncertain MOOTW environment.

General Krulak (1997), in “Commandant’s Planning Guidance Frag Order,” affirms this idea by making the individual Marine the focus in creating an agile, adaptable force to meet these 21st Century challenges: “the Marine Corps’ number one modernization and product improvement program will continue to be the individual Marine. Ultimately, people – not machines – determine our success in war.” (p. 1) MOOTW’s diversity of tasks and threats has implications for how Marines should be trained and educated, and how leaders and small units are developed for these current and future missions.

C. SCOPE

A study of how the U.S. military can better prepare for the challenges of future MOOTW can analyze many areas including: force structure, equipment procurement, technological advances, interrelations with non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), joint and multi-national military operations, doctrine, and individual and unit skills training requirements. Perhaps no area of analysis is more important than leadership development for MOOTW. Accordingly, this analysis focuses on leadership skills the Marine Corps’ junior leaders (the captains, lieutenants, sergeants and corporals who are on the proverbial “tip of the spear” in these military operations) need to develop to face

the myriad challenges MOOTW places on their ability to exercise sound judgement and decision-making in a complex, uncertain environment.

General Krulak's comments explain the need to focus on the small unit level:

The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level. (*Marines*, 1999)

One viewpoint is that these missions place small-unit leaders in the position of accomplishing tasks for which the military has not traditionally trained. Therefore, it is important to examine the nature of MOOTW and recent operational experience for implications to the methods used in preparing Marines for the unique requirements that these missions place on small unit leaders. Because of the frequency and diversity of MOOTW missions and the increased importance on small unit actions, a premium is placed now more than ever on developing sound leadership principles in our junior leaders and small units to be successful in varied and unexpected mission profiles. Consequently, the success of national policy objectives increasingly rests on a small unit leader's ability to make decisions and take action at the critical time and place. Their actions not only can determine tactical success, but also influence the operational and strategic success of a MOOTW.

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

1. Research Questions

Primary Question:

1. What are the leadership lessons learned from recent MOOTW that have implications for the development of the future Marine Corps' junior leaders and the small

units participating in these type operations?

Secondary Questions:

2. What are the unique leadership competencies and capabilities necessary for junior leaders and small units to be successful in future MOOTW?
3. Are there theoretical leadership development models which can be applied to Marine Corps leader development processes to help provide small-unit leaders with the necessary leadership competencies derived from operational experience?

2. Methodology

The methodology used to research these questions consists of the following:

1. Conduct a literature review of the characteristics of military operations other than war, the differences between MOOTW and traditional warfighting missions, and the special demands which MOOTW place upon small unit leaders. This literature review primarily examines official doctrinal publications.

2. Analyze qualitatively operational lessons learned from recent MOOTW missions to derive the implications for the development of junior leaders within the Marine Corps. These lessons learned are derived from examining MOOTW after-action reports including: official documents from units involved, studies and analyses by DOD centers, academic studies, military reviews, congressional records, and articles in professional journals.

3. Conduct a literature review of theoretical leadership development models and academic research in leadership to identify models that provide insight into improving current Marine Corps development processes for junior leaders and small-units. Selected models are integrated with the experiential data and doctrinal views of MOOTW to

provide insight into preparing small-unit leaders for the unique leadership competencies required in MOOTW.

E. ORGANIZATION AND BENEFIT OF STUDY

This thesis begins with the doctrinal examination of the Marine Corps' view of warfare in general and MOOTW in particular. Marine Corps doctrine and traditional theories of war serve as a reference point for the framework through which Marine leaders see the nature and conduct of warfare. This examination also extends to joint publications to further illustrate the view doctrinal publications take towards preparing the U.S. military to conduct MOOTW. By examining the professional military discourse on the nature of warfare and MOOTW, the thesis derives unique characteristics and leadership competencies for MOOTW.

After the doctrinal examination of MOOTW as one end of the spectrum of conflict, the study then examines actual operational lessons learned from recent MOOTW. These operational lessons focus on the implications for future development of the junior leaders who execute these types of missions. An inductive approach to this qualitative data results in some common themes for MOOTW leadership requirements as well as deficiencies that may exist in current development practices of the junior leaders and small-units who participated in these MOOTW.

This study then examines three important theoretical models of leadership development to better understand the leadership capabilities and competencies needed to operate successfully in the MOOTW environment. These models provide additional insight into educating and preparing small unit leaders for future MOOTW missions.

II. DOCTRINAL EXAMINATION OF WAR AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A. OVERVIEW

The term *military operations other than war* implies that such operations are inherently different from traditional warfare. However, the degree of difference between these operations and other "traditional" combat operations in terms of preparation, planning and conduct is open to debate. One view, supported by Marine Corps doctrinal philosophy, sees warfare encompassing the entire spectrum of conflict. Consequently, preparation for traditional war and MOOTW are not viewed as mutually exclusive.

The Marine Corps uses the "Three-Block War" metaphor to characterize future conflicts. This metaphor illustrates amorphous military operations where Marines must be skilled not only in traditional warfighting skills but also in other competencies unique to the MOOTW environment. General Krulak (1999) emphasizes the relevance of viewing current military operations through this framework: "The three block war is not simply a fanciful metaphor for future conflicts- it is a reality." (*Marines*, January, 1999) In his characterization, General Krulak points out that Marines must be prepared to act prudently in a chaotic environment where the "rules" have not yet been written.

This metaphor of the "Three-Block War" is an appropriate description of military operations other than war. The spectrum of tactical challenges General Krulak refers to may include distributing humanitarian relief supplies on one block, separating warring ethnic or tribal clans on another block, and being involved in full-scale firefights on the third block. Such operations present an array of difficult challenges for junior leaders

who must exercise sound decision-making in this fluid environment.

To prepare for such an environment, junior leaders must first look to their doctrine. By starting with doctrine, Marine Corps views on the nature and conduct of war, as well as military operations other than war, can be highlighted as the foundation for preparing leaders for all types of conflict. As all recent MOOTW have an aspect of "jointness," joint doctrine also is reviewed for approaches to prepare for and conduct MOOTW. These two sources of doctrine are the primary sources for preparing Marine forces for the unique environment of MOOTW.

Consequently, this chapter examines current Marine Corps warfighting doctrine and key historical theories of war which influenced formulation of this doctrine. Additionally, the diverse types of MOOTW are discussed, with recent Marine involvement in these types of missions used as illustrations. Finally, a comparison of the principles of war and the characteristics of MOOTW demonstrates distinctions between the traditional leadership competencies required for general warfare and those required for MOOTW.

B. TRADITIONAL VIEWS ON WARFARE AND MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE

1. Background

Professional education is an essential element in developing military leaders at all levels. Included in this professional military education are varied theories and ideas on armed conflict and warfare. The Marine Corps has integrated many of these theories into a synthesized strategy of preparing for and conducting warfare that becomes the strategic reference point for all Marine Corps leader development.

The Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP-1), *Warfighting*, is the definitive description of the Marine Corps philosophy on warfare. This manual is also the foundation for the training and development of Marine Corps leaders. General Krulak states that the purpose of this manual is to describe "the philosophy which distinguishes the U. S. Marine Corps. The thoughts contained here are not merely guidance for action in combat but a way of thinking. This publication provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight." (Foreward) Consequently, this examination of Marine Corps doctrine will focus exclusively on this bedrock publication.

Warfighting has profound implications for action throughout the Corps, including the small-unit leaders who will be tasked with future military operations other than war. *Warfighting* is not a reference manual for senior strategists and planners, but has broad application to all Marines in all situations. General Krulak writes in the foreword:

Experience has shown that the warfighting philosophy described on these pages applies far beyond the officer corps. I expect all Marines – enlisted and commissioned – to read this book, understand it, and act upon it. As General A. M. Gray describes in his foreword to the original in 1989, this publication describes a philosophy for action that, in war, in crisis, and in peace, dictates our approach to duty. (*Warfighting*, 1997)

As Marines often have little warning before being thrust into MOOTW environments, Marine Corps doctrine must provide a sound basis for action in all types of conflict. There is a saying that in times of crisis Marines revert to training. Since it is infeasible to train Marines for all scenarios which they may encounter during MOOTW, *Warfighting* provides the philosophy which will guide their actions during these missions. The influence of this manual on Marine Corps conduct and preparation for combat

missions cannot be underestimated. As a result, *Warfighting* must be the beginning for understanding leadership development and training in the Marine Corps.

2. *Warfighting*, Clausewitz, and the Nature of Warfare

In current Marine Corps warfighting philosophy, a few traditional theorists emerge as major influences on the evolution of doctrine, with the most influential being Carl von Clausewitz. Indeed, the military writings of Clausewitz are required reading for Marine leaders.

A thorough knowledge of Clausewitz's theories, particularly his ideas about the nature and theory of war, contributes greatly to understanding how the Marine Corps views and, consequently, prepares for military operations. This section emphasizes the most influential of Clausewitz's principles that have helped shape Marine warfare philosophy and the current doctrine of maneuver warfare. The philosophy of maneuver warfare guides Marine leaders throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, including MOOTW. By examining Marine warfighting doctrine, we can identify principles that guide the development and preparation of leaders who must carry out MOOTW.

An overview of the doctrinal influence of Clausewitz on the Marine Corps must begin with his definition of war: "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." (P. 75) His emphasis on forceful imposition of one's will on the enemy is central to his description of the nature of warfare. He continues this view of the violent nature of warfare by stressing the necessity for the maximum use of force and maximum exertion of strength as requirements for success. Clausewitz views war as a violent struggle which

should not be limited in its scope or brutality. He states that "war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force." (P. 77)

The Marine Corps has adopted much of his view on the nature of war. Compare the Clausewitzian characterization of war to the description of war in *Warfighting*:

"War is a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force." Marine Corps doctrinal descriptions of war continue with heavy influence by the Clausewitz idea of war as a *zweikampf*, or literally a "two-struggle." This idea characterizes war as "a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other."

(*Warfighting*, p. 3) The Marine Corps, then, concurs with Clausewitz on the object of warfare: the imposition of our will on the enemy.

While the object of warfare-- imposition of will --appears to be a simple concept, the means to achieve such an object are complex. Clausewitz recognizes this complexity by discussing his concept of "friction" as being inherent in warfare. Friction is the result of the clash of wills between belligerents and "is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult." (P. 121) This Clausewitzian idea of friction has definitive impact on military leaders' ability to make wartime decisions.

Barry Watts (1996) breaks down Clausewitz' sources of friction into the following:

1. Danger
2. Physical exertion
3. Uncertainties and imperfections in the information on which action in war is based
4. Friction in the narrow sense of the resistance within one's own forces
5. Chance events that cannot be readily foreseen

6. Physical and political limits to the use of military force
7. Unpredictability stemming from interaction with the enemy
8. Disconnects between the ends and means in war. (P. 32)

These sources of Clausewitzian friction also exist in military operations other than war.

In fact, the following review of doctrinal descriptions of MOOTW reveals that these sources of friction can become even more pronounced in such an environment. Friction, then, plays a large role in any study of doctrinal preparation for military operations, and Marine Corps doctrine in particular devotes significant attention to the importance of recognizing sources of friction in combat.

Many military theorists believe that Clausewitz's concept of general friction and its impact on time-competitive decision making in warfare is his greatest contribution to modern military thinking. Certainly his idea of friction pervading all aspects of military operations heavily influences how the Marine Corps prepares and trains leaders for combat operations.

The Marine Corps consciously attempts to approximate wartime friction in developing Marines' leadership skills. The goal of Marine Corps combat training is to replicate the sources of friction through realistic scenarios. Such scenarios often include maneuvers against aggressor forces in unfamiliar terrain, providing both an opposing will and uncertainty as real sources of training friction. The use of live ammunition and physically demanding exercises impose additional sources of friction upon Marines in training. However, *Warfighting* recognizes the limitations of such efforts:

We can readily identify countless examples of friction, but until we have experienced it ourselves, we cannot hope to appreciate it fully. Only through experience can we come to appreciate the force of will necessary

to overcome friction and to develop a realistic appreciation for what is possible in war and what is not. While training should attempt to approximate the conditions of war, we must realize it can never fully duplicate the level of friction in real combat. (P. 6)

This comment illustrates the crux of the problem in developing small-unit leaders for combat. How does the Marine Corps prepare leaders to make decisions in this environment of friction? The question becomes arguably even more important during MOOTW where young, inexperienced Marines operating in chaotic environments must make decisions that can have far greater strategic impact than similar decisions during general warfare.

The Clausewitzian concept of general friction as an integral part of warfare logically leads to the remaining attributes of the nature of war delineated in Marine Corps doctrine. *MCDP-1* lists the following characteristics of war: uncertainty, disorder, fluidity, complexity, the human dimension, violence and danger, and physical, moral and mental forces. These characteristics are how the Marine Corps views the nature of war and the environment for which Marines must be prepared. While being classified as the nature of "war," one can easily see these same dynamic attributes present in military operations other than war as illustrated by the "three block war" metaphor.

Clearly, Clausewitzian theory plays a major role in providing what *Warfighting* terms a common view of war among Marines: "A common view of war among Marines is a necessary base for the development of a cohesive doctrine because our approach to the conduct of war derives from our understanding of the nature of war." (p. 3) .

3. The Theory of Warfare and Spectrums of Conflict

The implications of traditional views on the nature of war – which stress maximizing the application of violence to impose one's will on one's enemy – on the preparation for MOOTW are important. Marine Corps doctrine and warfighting theory embrace the views of Clausewitz on the nature of warfare, and consequently must reconcile and adapt such traditional views with the complex political environment of MOOTW, where limits on use of force are often the norm. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, for example, are not necessarily operations where force or violence should be maximized. Current doctrine, then, must be flexible in adopting traditional views on the nature of war.

Marine doctrine attempts such reconciliation through a major Clausewitzian theory of warfare: war as an extension of politics. Clausewitz believes "that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." (P. 87) *Warfighting* adopts this principle and states that "the single most important thought to understand about our theory is that war *must serve policy*." (P. 23) *Warfighting* notes that "conflict can take a wide range of forms constituting a spectrum which reflects the magnitude of violence involved. At one end of the spectrum are those actions referred to as military operations other than war in which the application of military power is usually restrained and selective." (P. 26) The other end of the spectrum is full-scale combat operations between belligerents where force is unrestrained. Thus, by discussing spectrums of conflict, the Marine Corps

philosophy reconciles the Clausewitzian principle of the maximum use of force with his views of the primacy of political goals in warfare.

Clausewitz writes that "the maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of intellect." (P. 75) Thus, Marine leaders must be intelligent in choosing and applying the appropriate level of force during all conflicts. Marine Corps doctrine demands that its leaders exercise such use of intellect in decision-making by continuing its discussion of the spectrums of conflict.

Military operations other than war and small wars are more probable than a major regional conflict or general war. Many political groups simply do not possess the military means to wage war at the high end of the spectrum. The Marine Corps, as the nation's force-in-readiness, must have the versatility and flexibility to deal with a situation at any intensity across the entire spectrum of conflict. This is a greater challenge than it may appear: Military operations other than war and small wars are not simply lesser forms of general war. A modern military force capable of waging a war against a large conventional force may find itself ill-prepared for a "small" war against a lightly equipped guerilla force." (*Warfighting*, pp. 27-28)

The Marine Corps recognizes the necessity to prepare its leaders to understand the nature of war as defined by Clausewitz, while being able to exercise judgement in the application of force in MOOTW where political ends do not allow for limitless military force. By adopting the Clausewitzian principle of war as an extension of policy, *Warfighting* mandates that Marines adjust the use of military force based upon the context of the mission.

Another important aspect of Marine Corps warfare theory is understanding the levels of warfare: strategic, operational and tactical. In traditional theory, such as that of Clausewitz, the strategic level focuses on war as an extension of national objectives.

Marine doctrine lists the strategic as the highest level. The tactical level, the lowest level in the hierarchy, involves the concepts and methods used to accomplish a particular mission at a particular time and place. The operational level links the strategic and tactical levels by using tactical results to achieve strategic objectives.

Traditionally, these levels of warfare, while always containing some overlap, could be viewed distinctly by military leaders and planners. However, in the metaphor of the "Three-Block War," these levels become compressed and blurred. *MCDP-1* specifically recognizes that military operations other than war are just such a case where "even a small-unit leader, for example, may find that "tactical" actions have direct strategic implications." (P. 32) Figure 1 is a graphic comparison of the conventional depiction of the levels of warfare with the compressed levels of warfare which are experienced by the small-unit leaders operating in military operations other than war.

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL

STRATEGIC
OPERATIONAL
TACTICAL

Figure 1: Conventional Levels of War vs. Compressed Levels of War

Marine Corps warfighting doctrine also recognizes the additional leadership burden the compressed levels of war in MOOTW place upon small-unit leaders. General Krulak stresses the leadership burdens and political implications of this compression on junior Marines:

Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress -- decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion. In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation. (*Marines*, 1999, p 4.)

Marine doctrine, then, recognizes the increasing leadership responsibilities and roles the small-unit leader plays in this atmosphere of compressed levels of warfare.

4. *Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare as a Mental Model*

Marine Corps doctrine provides the junior leaders who must operate in the MOOTW environment with what Peter Senge (1990) termed as *mental models*. Since Marines in times of crisis revert to training, Marine Corps warfighting philosophy provides individuals with a foundation to guide their actions. *Warfighting*, through the philosophy of maneuver warfare, ingrains fundamental beliefs of how success is attained on the modern battlefield.

Senge describes mental models as deeply held internal images of how the world works which limit individuals and organizations to familiar ways of thinking and acting. By necessity many military actions must be based upon ingrained mental models. Actions such as immediate action drills upon enemy contact or emergency procedures in

an aircraft are examples of reverting to training in a crisis. Training for violent combat action against a well-defined enemy also often follows established procedures for offensive operations, defensive operations, movement to contact, etc.

Though variations in these procedures are situationally dependent, definite tactics and techniques are employed so that higher, lower and adjacent units can operate in consonance towards a common goal. The analogy of "operating from the same sheet of music" is reiterated throughout training exercises. Certainly, such operational mental models are necessary in large combat operations, otherwise self-induced friction and Clausewitz's "fog of war" would be magnified by disjointed, incoherent friendly maneuver.

However, reliance on mental models for guidance of actions in all situations may become problematic for organizations who must operate in the "three-block war" where General Krulak notes that the rules have yet to be written. Integral to Clausewitz's ideas on the nature of war being a *zweikampf* is the presence of the adversary's independent will. This adversary may not act according to one's individual mental model. A fluid, uncertain environment such as MOOTW, coupled with an opposing independent will, make establishing a doctrinal mental model for Marines difficult.

Warfighting recognizes this challenge of providing Marines mental models in establishing the philosophy of maneuver warfare:

The challenge is to develop a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield. What exactly does this require? It requires a concept of warfighting that will help us function effectively in an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment – in fact, one with which we can exploit

these conditions to our advantage. It requires a concept that is consistently effective across the full spectrum of conflict because we cannot expect to change our basic doctrine from situation to situation and expect to be proficient. (*Warfighting*, 1997, p. 71)

Senge writes that "what is most important to grasp is that mental models are *active* – they shape how we act." (P. 175) The active model which the Marine Corps has adopted as a concept for warfighting is maneuver warfare. The doctrine of maneuver warfare is based upon rapid, flexible and opportunistic maneuver. This concept uses maneuver not just in the classical military sense of gaining a positional or spatial advantage, but rather generating and exploiting advantages which may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial.

The Marine Corps definition of maneuver warfare is: "... a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope." (P. 73) Couple this philosophy with the views on the nature and theory of warfare, and *Warfighting* provides Marines with not only the mental model of the environ of combat, but also how to function and succeed in this environment. *Warfighting*, then, establishes in Marines what Senge terms "our internal pictures of how the world works," both individually and organizationally. In this case, that "world" is warfare.

Senge believes that deeply held mental models can impede individuals within an organization from creative or innovative action. If *Warfighting* and maneuver warfare is the model for guidance of action for Marine leaders, is the concept indeed flexible enough

to be applied to the challenges of military operations other than war? Often in MOOTW, Marines are tasked with stabilizing a volatile situation, not creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation.

Maneuver warfare, then, must provide a template for action that the Marine Corps believes will lead to success across the full spectrum of combat operations. This template includes such principles as speed, surprise, focus of effort and boldness, all essential elements of successful combat operations. Such a concept provides a strong mental model on how to systematically attack a defined enemy force, but in MOOTW the utility is less clear. Can the model of maneuver warfare be problematic if Marines use it to guide their actions in military operations other than war? Certainly this mental model could cause difficulty in some situations if treated too rigidly, but rigidity does not have to occur.

While Senge notes that mental models can impede learning, he also asks "why can't they accelerate learning?" (P. 178) Senge emphasizes the importance of managing mental models by surfacing, testing and improving an organization's internal pictures of how the world works. The Marine Corps attempts to manage its mental models by recognizing the inherent nature of war as chaotic. Consequently, the philosophy embodied in *Warfighting* is not prescriptive, but rather descriptive. The environment of combat is an essential element of this model, with maneuver warfare providing a flexible guide to actions in such an environment. Warfighting, as the cornerstone of Marine leadership development, provides a mental model for Marine leaders to apply during tactical leadership training throughout their development.

Mental models are necessary in an organization such as the Marine Corps, and cannot necessarily be viewed as organizational rigidity to outdated ways of thinking or impediments to learning and innovative action by Marines. To the contrary *Warfighting* emphasizes recognition of the unique environment of combat and what attributes will lead to success:

Maneuver warfare requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations...Finally, maneuver warfare requires the ability to think above our own level and to act at our own level in a way that is in consonance with the requirements of the larger situation. (*Warfighting*, 1997, p. 76)

The model reinforces this image of uncertainty, providing further guidance to action in the combat environment:

Since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem. Therefore, we should not agonize over one. The essence of the problem is to select a promising course of action and to do it more quickly than our foe. (*Warfighting*, 1997, p. 87)

Thus, the mental model of *Warfighting* emphasizes the environment, while not providing prescriptive solutions for any one problem. An examination of operational experience may yield elements of this mental model which may be refined in order to provide more prescriptive guidance for the "Three Block War." Maneuver warfare, though, must provide a fluid mental model for leaders to cope with the entire spectrum of conflict.

The flexibility of thought is an essential aspect of the Marine Corps model, but the last part of the description of maneuver warfare is also critical: thinking systemically. The idea of systems thinking is essential to generating useful mental models. The Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver warfare explicitly states that "maneuver warfare attacks the

enemy 'system.' The enemy system is whatever constitutes the entity confronting us within our particular sphere." This fundamental precept of Marine doctrine demands systemic thinking at all levels during military operations. Individual commanders and Marines must always be cognizant of the impact their actions have on the larger organizational system. Thinking systemically not only applies to combat operations in general warfare, but is also essential in military operations other than war.

The junior leader in the "Three-Block War" may have entirely different "enemies" than even his adjacent unit leader only one block away. His tactical actions can have strategic implications. Without systems thinking, junior leaders can develop poor decision-making processes. Consequently, thinking in terms of the overall effect individual actions have on the entire system is an essential aspect of warfighting doctrine which has implications throughout the spectrum of conflict.

Doctrine must not contribute to a rigid organizational mental model that it is not malleable to the diversity of situations encountered in such missions. Doctrine, however, needs to provide Marines with the guidance of action necessary in a large organization tasked with myriad mission profiles. *Warfighting* as the cornerstone of Marine Corps doctrine attempts to specify such a model for Marine leaders by furnishing assumptions believed to facilitate success in combat operations.

C. CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

1. Background

Though *Warfighting* emphasizes that the doctrinal philosophy is applicable through the entire spectrum of conflict, distinct differences between traditional combat

operations and military operations other than war are recognized and described in other doctrinal publications, such as joint publications. Marines rarely operate as an autonomous service in MOOTW and must work harmoniously with other services, nations and non-governmental organizations. Accordingly, Marine leaders must also be intimately familiar with joint publications on MOOTW. The joint publications governing combined service operations make definite delineations between approaches to action during MOOTW and traditional combat operations. These distinctive characteristics of MOOTW as outlined in joint doctrine are examined below.

2. Types of Operations

Joint Doctrine delineates the types of operations which are officially classified as military operations other than war. Figure 2 displays the doctrinal operations defined in Joint Pub. 3-07:

Types of MOOTW Operations

- Arms Control
- Combating Terrorism
- DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations
- Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations
- Enforcing Exclusion Zones
- Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)
- Nation Assistance/ Support to Counterinsurgency
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
 - Peace Operations (PO)
 - Protection of Shipping
 - Recovery Operations
- Show of Force Operations
- Strikes and Raids

Figure 2: Types of MOOTW (*Joint Pub 3-07*, p. III-1)

Certainly the Marine Corps has been involved in most, if not all, types of these missions since the end of the Cold War. These types of missions have been conducted in different environments using varied force compositions (Appendix A). The sheer diversity of the mission tasks require all Marines to be familiar with the unique characteristics of MOOTW.

3. Specific Characteristics of MOOTW

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, is the United States official doctrine for the conduct of MOOTW. This publication describes the subtle yet definite differences between the military's traditional wartime operations and the MOOTW requirements. The doctrine notes that, "although MOOTW and war may seem similar in action, **MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace** while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national interests. MOOTW are more **sensitive to political considerations** and often the military may not be the primary player. **More restrictive rules of engagement** and a hierarchy of national objectives are followed." (P.vii) This joint publication emphasizes the differences between MOOTW and war by adding the boldface to the unique considerations in MOOTW.

Additionally, Joint Pub 3-07 delineates distinctive principles of MOOTW separate from the principles of war that have been traditionally trained towards in the U.S. military. Figure 3 displays these separate sets of doctrinal principles:

<u>Principles of War</u>	<u>Principles of MOOTW</u>
• Objective	• Objective
• Offensive	• Unity of Effort
• Simplicity	• Legitimacy
• Mass	• Perseverance
• Maneuver	• Restraint
• Security	• Security

• Surprise	
• Unity of Command	
• Economy of Force	

Figure 3: Comparing War and MOOTW

The distinction between the principles of war and those of MOOTW are further doctrinal evidence that MOOTW should be viewed as a distinctive type of military operation.

Joint doctrine amplifies the distinctiveness of MOOTW, discussing some unique characteristics and considerations that must be planned for by U.S. forces:

a. Primacy of Politics

All discussions of MOOTW discuss the primacy of political considerations during such operations. At first glance, this primacy of politics does not seem so different from traditional wartime operations. Indeed, much of the traditional theories of war focus on the use of military force as an implementation of national political policy. Again, Joint Pub 3-07 discusses the differences between the two. The major difference is that in MOOTW, **“political considerations permeate all levels.”** (p. I-1) The idea that all force levels involved must be concerned with political implications is unique to the MOOTW environment and has implications for the decision-making processes of junior military leaders involved.

Traditionally, once military forces were committed as an instrument of national policy, small unit leaders did not concern themselves with political ramifications of their decisions, but rather focused on accomplishing assigned wartime missions. While

mission accomplishment remains the focus of effort, the means of accomplishing MOOTW missions can be restrictive and cloudy. Joint Pub 3-07 clearly recognizes the impact junior military members can have on political goals in MOOTW:

All military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications. (JCS, 1995, p. I-2)

Such concern for national and local political ramifications is a departure from traditional wartime decision-making at the small unit level. Political considerations are but one example of how recent military operations other than war have differed from historical combat operations and place unique demands on junior leaders.

b. Decentralized Environment For Decision-Making

Another theme that arises in studies of MOOTW is the decentralized environment for decision-making in which small-unit leaders now operate. Douglas Johnson (1998) collected a number of first-person monographs from officers attending the U.S. Army War College who had recent experience in the Bosnia MOOTW. In summarizing his conclusions from this collection, he notes in MOOTW, "while our operations are tightly centralized as far as policy formulation is concerned, we have been forced by circumstances to rely upon decentralized execution to an unusual degree. This has forced us to depend upon junior officers and NCO's in ways we have talked about for decades, but have seldom practiced." (p. 2)

Military leaders echo Johnson's conclusion on increasing reliance upon junior leaders due to this decentralized decision-making environment. Young leaders who must patrol, fly, or assist local populace in these diverse environments are often operating independently from higher units and are forced to make timely decisions without consulting senior leadership. General Krulak (1999) illustrates this point:

The Corps is, by design, a relatively young force. Success or failure will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability to make the right decision at the right time at the point of contact. Today's Marines will often operate far "from the flagpole" without the direct supervision of senior leadership. And, they will be asked to deal with a bewildering array of challenges and threats. (*Marines*, 1999, p. 4)

Joint doctrine concurs with General Krulak's assessment of decision-making being pushed to the lowest levels of command during MOOTW. While *Joint Vision 2010* describes pursuing a strategy of achieving full spectrum dominance through information and technological superiority, this template of the future recognizes the inherent limitations of this pursuit. Doctrinal publications realize that future adversaries will attempt to attack U.S. interests asymmetrically in order to counter our information and technological dominance. In the face of such asymmetric attacks, *Joint Vision 2010* reiterates the importance of junior leader decisive actions as the key to success:

We recognize that, regardless of how sophisticated technology becomes, the individual warfighter's judgment, creativity, and adaptability in the face of highly dynamic situations will be essential to the success of future joint operations. The human element is especially important in situations where we cannot bring our technological capabilities to bear against opponents who seek to nullify our technological superiority by various

means. In these cases, our success will depend upon the physical, intellectual and moral strengths of the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine – especially their adaptability in the face of the unexpected. (JCS, 1996, p. 27)

Joint Pub 3-07 reiterates this sentiment in describing the autonomy of action necessary at the small unit level. In laying out joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP's) for action in MOOTW, this joint publication again places the burden of success squarely on the junior leader. The introduction to these JTTP's quotes Brigadier M. Harbottle, UN Forces, Cyprus:

There is no doubt in my mind that the success of a peace-keeping operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests. (Joint Pub 3-07, 1996, p. III-1)

This emphasis on decisive action at the junior levels is a direct result of the compressed levels of warfare and primacy of political considerations in a decentralized environment that have been demonstrated as inherent characteristics of MOOTW.

c. Diverse Mission Tasks

Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of missions with specific skill requirements. These operations are diverse and may demand leadership competencies not specifically addressed in unit and individual training programs. General Anthony Zinni (1995) illustrates the diversity of missions he was tasked with as Commanding General (CG) of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF):

The missions we get certainly are nontraditional– I have trained and established police forces, judiciary committees and judges, and prison

systems; I have resettled refugees, in massive numbers, twice; I've negotiated with warlords, tribal leaders, and clan elders; I have distributed food, provided medical assistance, worried about well-baby care, and put in place obstetrical clinics; I've run refugee camps; and I've managed newspapers and run radio stations to counter misinformation attempts. I'm an infantryman of 30 years standing. Nowhere in my infantry training did anybody prepare me for all this. (*Proceedings*, 1995, p. 45)

His experiences are surely not unique to his time in command of this force and are illustrative of the future requirements placed upon Marine commanders. And while he speaks in the first person, the Marines under his command, especially small-unit leaders, were heavily involved in the execution of these missions. There is little doubt that these junior leaders had a similar lack of familiarity and formal training for these missions.

Joint doctrine does recognize the importance of training junior military leaders to be prepared for this diversity of mission tasks. Accordingly, *Joint Vision 2010* has delineated leader development as one of the four foundations of a quality force for the future. This conceptual template published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) discusses the types of leaders necessary in this diverse, complex operational environment:

Our future leaders at all levels of command must understand the interrelationships among military power, diplomacy, and economic pressure, as well as the role of various government agencies and non-governmental actors, in achieving our security objectives. They will require a sophisticated understanding of historical context and communication skills to succeed in the future...In short, our leaders must demonstrate the very highest level of skill and versatility in ever more complex joint and multinational operations. (JCS, 1996, pp. 28-29)

Clearly this describes a daunting task in developing the variety of skills that the small-unit leader will need for MOOTW success. This joint publication also explicitly emphasizes developing such competencies *at all levels of command*. The Joint Chiefs

have required even the most junior leaders to understand the complexities of MOOTW.

D. SUMMARY

This section has focused on a doctrinal examination of warfare and military operations other than war. An overview of the importance of doctrine to the leadership development of the junior leaders who must execute MOOTW has been presented. Traditional views on warfare and their influence on current Marine Corps and joint doctrine were examined as a foundation for preparing the Corps' small-unit leaders for future MOOTW missions.

Additionally, the doctrine was studied for similarities and differences between the preparation for and conduct of traditional warfighting tasks and those required during MOOTW. The doctrinal training of Marine Corps leaders was reviewed using the *Warfighting* publication as the framework by which these leaders are developed. Such doctrinal training impacts the organizational and individual mental model through which Marines view the environment and requirements of warfare. By examining this doctrinal model of the nature and theory of war, this review illustrates the Marine Corps methodology in preparing its junior leaders to conduct military operations across the spectrum of conflict, including MOOTW.

This section also provided an examination of Marine Corps and joint views on the unique MOOTW environment. In this examination some thematic characteristics of MOOTW emerged: (1) the criticality and centrality of the small-unit leader to MOOTW success, (2) the primacy of political considerations, (3) the diverse types of mission tasks involved in the myriad of MOOTW, and (4) a decision-making environment where junior

leaders must exercise judgement in the absence of direct higher supervision.

These thematic views of MOOTW logically lead to an examination of operational lessons learned from recent MOOTW. Examples of Marine Corps participation in recent MOOTW are presented in Appendix A to illustrate the relevance and diversity of the missions assigned to Marine Corps units. In Chapter IV, these missions among others will be examined for experiential lessons of junior leaders and small-units and to determine implications for the development of future leaders for MOOTW. The thematic characteristics coupled with operational experience may yield lessons which can be applied to future leadership development processes in the Marine Corps.

III. PREPARING LEADERS FOR WAR AND MOOTW

A. BACKGROUND

Although the preceding examination specifies distinct doctrinal characteristics of MOOTW versus traditional warfighting, there remains discussion within the military establishment on how differently MOOTW should be treated in preparing forces to conduct these missions. The approaches to training, educating and developing the leadership necessary for such operations is central to this discussion. Views differ on how much specific preparation is required for MOOTW as opposed to training for more traditional combat missions. These different views range from concentrating simply on traditional military skills and warfighting competencies -- as the U.S. military has historically done-- to establishing specific units within the military who will be specially equipped and trained to conduct only MOOTW. The Marine Corps approach falls in between the two ends of this discussion.

The preceding chapter has shown the Marine Corps doctrinal approach to preparing leaders to conduct both war and MOOTW. This chapter provides some complementary discussion by military observers with relevance toward the Marine Corps approach to developing junior leader skills for MOOTW. Additionally, an overview of current MOOTW specific training and education given to junior Marine leaders is presented.

1. Is Preparation for MOOTW Different From Preparation for War?

Military planners, analysts and observers grapple with the "uniqueness" of MOOTW in preparing forces to conduct these missions. Numerous doctrinal

publications, such as *Joint Pub 3-07* and *MCWP 3-33*, are devoted entirely to the missions which encompass the term MOOTW. But much of this doctrine qualifies its treatment of preparation for MOOTW as inherently different from conventional warfare.

Joint Pub 3-07 for example explicitly states,

Readying the forces for MOOTW requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces – to fight and win the nation's wars. For most types of MOOTW, military personnel adapt their warfighting skills to the situation. (p. IV-13)

Many military analysts view qualifying the differences between preparing leaders for war and MOOTW as necessary due to the combat skills required in both types of conflict.

a. War and MOOTW are Interrelated

Inherent in the "Three Block War" metaphor is the interrelationship of combat and non-combat leadership roles in MOOTW. The metaphor assumes that preparation for all tasks in these missions is essential and that developing leaders for war and MOOTW cannot be viewed as mutually exclusive. Others in the military establishment concur with this assumption of the "Three Block War," and in fact take this metaphor further in presenting the argument that preparation for war is preparation for MOOTW.

Richard Rinaldo (1996), an analyst in the Directorate of Joint Army Doctrine, compares the doctrinal principles of war and MOOTW as evidence that preparing for both is fundamentally interrelated. Indeed, joint doctrine specifically pronounces that the doctrinal principles of war "generally apply to MOOTW." (*Joint Pub 3-07*, 1995, p. IV-1) Rinaldo (1996) discusses the complementary principles and characteristics of warfare:

The approach to training for such operations (MOOTW) found in joint and service doctrine stands on a pillar of training for war that allows commanders to adjust to operational conditions, including peace operations. Moreover, doctrine does not deal with the planning process for MOOTW any differently than it does for war. (*JFQ*, p. 111)

Rinaldo notes that in addition to the training and the planning process for MOOTW being similar to training for general warfare, the entire premise of doctrinally separating the operating principles of war and MOOTW may be flawed. In Chapter II, Figure 3 compares the doctrinal principles of warfare to generic principles required in MOOTW. Although joint doctrine separates these principles, Rinaldo uses these principles to support his view that MOOTW should not be viewed in isolation from traditional combat operations. He states,

The flawed distinction between the principles of war and those of MOOTW tends to inspire independence when interdependence exists and divergence where there is unity. Put more subtly, MOOTW may involve combat and require attention to the principles of war. But that commanders must apply two sets of principles in MOOTW which involve combat may be unnecessary. (*JFQ*, p. 114)

Rinaldo then uses these doctrinal principles to demonstrate the relationship between warfighting and peace operations. Certainly, there is overlap and interrelationship between the principles of war and MOOTW. Figure 3 depicts these interrelationships. For example, objective remains the primary focus of both, and security is ever-present as an operating principle. Rinaldo also asks if legitimacy is any less important in war than in MOOTW. Or is the idea of maneuver-- establishing a relational advantage-- not important in MOOTW? Certainly the Marine Corps believes that its philosophy of maneuver warfare applies equally across the spectrum of conflict.

Rinaldo's analysis continues to highlight the overlap of the doctrinal principles by noting that the principles of war mass and surprise also have their utility in MOOTW in achieving decisive results. He quotes General Colin Powell (1993):

Decisive doesn't mean overwhelming. Decisive means decisive. It means committing the force needed to achieve the political objective. If the political objective is very circumscribed, the force should still be decisive in order to achieve that limited objective. (Rinaldo, 1996, p. 115)

Rinaldo's premise is that a review of the complex relationship between warfighting and peace operations reveals that the principles of war remain "complete and enduring in providing fundamental guidelines for conducting military operations. They relate to the full spectrum of operations. There is no need to view them in isolation from or in addition to the principles of MOOTW" (p. 116) Rinaldo's analysis of the doctrinal principles of war as compared to MOOTW represents one prevalent viewpoint that preparing for war also prepares military forces and leaders for the challenges of MOOTW.

The Marine Corps, with its *Warfighting* publication, also takes the view that training to the philosophy of maneuver warfare will be a blueprint for success across the entire spectrum of conflict. However, whereas *Warfighting*, *Joint Vision 2010*, and *Joint Pub 3-07* do note the unique burdens MOOTW place upon junior leaders, Rinaldo takes a macro view in his doctrinal examination and does not address the intricacies of MOOTW at the small unit level. This study puts his premise of the universality of training to the principles of war to the test by examining small-unit leadership lessons learned from recent military operations other than war.

While Rinaldo focuses on the doctrinal preparation of military forces for both war and MOOTW, other military observers analyze force structure, as well as doctrine, as an important aspect in preparing operational forces for success in future conflicts. Wray R. Johnson (1998) posits in *Military Review* that "the U.S. military's conventional heritage and predisposition will remain intact and drive decisions affecting doctrine, force structure and readiness, and, therefore, affect the Armed Forces' ability to effectively conduct MOOTW missions." (p. 69) Johnson believes altering the conventional force structure to meet the growing primacy of MOOTW is impractical and unwise.

Consequently, Johnson asserts that using this conventional warfighting force structure and organization in new and innovative ways is the key to preparing our forces for future success. Johnson states his position "that effective employment of general purpose US forces in MOOTW can be achieved through conceptual innovation." (p. 70)

His analysis concludes that the Armed Force's reluctance to reconfigure structurally to meet MOOTW demands stems largely from warfighting readiness concerns in an era of declining budgets and force levels. Johnson notes the paradox between the doctrinal treatment of MOOTW as a unique military mission and a military which continues to organize, train and equip forces for conventional warfare. He points out how doctrine reconciles this seeming paradox:

Where (current doctrine) breaks with former limited-warfare doctrine is in the recognition that, although the theoretical ideal is the primacy of the political, the reality is the predisposition of the US Army (and all of the services) to conduct conventional warfare. Consequently, doctrine correctly attempts to reconcile the paradox by encouraging commanders to consider innovative means to adapt conventional warfare principles to unconventional conflict. Whether or not this framework will succeed

remains to be seen, but it is an honest attempt to bring doctrine and drill in agreement. It is this aspect of current military thinking that is most encouraging with respect to defining military operations in the post-Cold War era. (*Military Review*, 1998-99, p. 75)

Johnson's analysis reflects both the dilemmas of the "Three Block War" and the approach the Marine Corps takes with flexible doctrinal principles which the commander's can apply across the spectrum of conflict. Thus, where Rinaldo sees preparation for war and MOOTW as not being mutually exclusive, Johnson points to the importance of commanders to recognize the unique demands of MOOTW and be able to adapt conventional structure and doctrinal principles to the situation. Both of these viewpoints on the differences and similarities between war and MOOTW seem to be in line with the Marine Corps approach to developing leaders concurrently for traditional warfighting as well as MOOTW- or preparing leaders for the "Three Block War."

B. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT MARINE CORPS LEADERSHIP TRAINING FOR MOOTW

Leading Marines is the most important responsibility for any Marine, at any level of command. The preceding doctrinal examination of MOOTW has shown that, in greater frequency, this leadership responsibility has been placed upon junior Marines in the unique environment of MOOTW. Consequently, an overview of how these small-unit leaders are being developed for leading Marines in MOOTW is necessary.

The "Three Block War" metaphor emphasizes the flexibility of leaders to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. Junior Marine leaders are broadly educated in warfighting skills believed to be essential across the full range of military operations. However, some education and training in the specifics of MOOTW are addressed in

junior leader development. This approach is in line with the guidance set forth in *Joint Pub 3-07* which states that "a well-trained force can adapt to MOOTW under the leadership of officers and NCO's educated in the principles and types of MOOTW." (1995, p. IV-14)

This section describes this MOOTW specific education at the small-unit leader level. An in-depth analysis of Marine PME is beyond the scope of this study, but an overview of MOOTW specific education is given for insight into the proportion of Marine leader development which is formally devoted to these mission types. This overview leads into the tactical lessons learned from recent operations by providing some understanding of how these small-unit leaders were prepared for these operations.

1. Formal Officer Development For MOOTW

To win the MOOTW battle, the Marine Corps has increasingly specialized training practices to better prepare junior leaders for complex MOOTW missions. The foundation for leader development at the officer level is The Basic School (TBS) which is attended by all newly commissioned officers. The six-month long curriculum from the Basic Officer Course (BOC) at TBS reveals that some introductory training on the specific characteristics of MOOTW is incorporated. Figure 4 depicts the curriculum modules of the BOC at TBS (www.mcu.usmc.mil/TBS/ 1999). Of particular note is that the BOC module, *Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)*, consists of just four hours of introductory lectures on the subjects of: (1) Introduction to MOOTW, (2) Introduction to Terrorism, (3) Counterinsurgency Principles and, (4) Combating Terrorism. These are the dedicated MOOTW subjects out of a six-month curriculum.

Basic Officer Course
Amphibious Operations
Aviation
Combat Service Support
Communications
Field Engineering
First Aid
Intelligence
Land Navigation
Leadership and Training
Military Law
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare Defense
Personnel Administration
Physical Training
Professional Development
Supporting Arms
Tactics
Weapons

Figure 4: Basic Officer Course at The Basic School

Despite the relative lack of dedicated instruction to MOOTW, there is obviously training not classified as MOOTW specific that has direct relevance to these mission types. Nearly all types of basic officer skills taught at TBS are necessary requirements for the platoon leader to be successful in all types of conflict, including MOOTW. Basic military skills such as communications, engineering, infantry skills, weapons knowledge, supporting arms employment, first aid, and intelligence are all necessary for any TBS graduate who will conduct MOOTW. These skills are essential in leading Marines and are applicable across the full range of military operations. However, recent operational experience may reveal further military skills with specific application to MOOTW which are not emphasized in the BOC at TBS.

The emphasis on MOOTW specific training and leadership development varies greatly at the next level of officer development, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) school. These schools are narrowly focused on MOS skill requirements. Consequently, the level of training and education for MOOTW missions depends on the type of MOS an officer enters. Some schools-- such as flight training and field artillery school for example-- teach skills necessary to be experts in equipment. These skills are not necessarily taught in relation to a specific context-- how the skills pertain to any particular mission environment such as MOOTW.

Other MOS schools do have MOOTW specific training. The Infantry Officer's Course (IOC) is the best example because of the obvious centrality and relevance of the infantryman to MOOTW. In this curriculum, infantry lieutenants are taught many of the tactical and leadership decision-making skills necessary for MOOTW success. Such training involves numerous field exercises (FEX) where lieutenants must exercise decision-making skills involving urban patrolling, cordon and search, riot control, convoy and rear-area security, among other skills inherent in MOOTW. Additionally, IOC conducts scenario-based FEX's on doctrinal MOOTW missions such as NEO, strikes and raids, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP), and embassy reinforcement. These infantry lieutenants appear better educated, trained and developed for the specifics of MOOTW at IOC than at other MOS schools.

The next formal education opportunity occurs at the rank of captain. All Marine captains must complete the Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) PME or attend an equivalent Career Level School (CLS) in another service such as the Army. This career

level PME is required for all Marine Corps captains regardless of MOS. The AWS course of instruction is offered either at the resident school or through the non-resident program correspondence course. Only about twenty percent of any peer group of captains has the opportunity to attend the nine-month resident school, so the majority of captains complete the non-resident correspondence course.

The resident course has a dedicated MOOTW package in the curriculum. (AWS, Lesson Designator A(O)3601, 1998) This MOOTW instructional package, however, is only eight training days out of the nine-month course of instruction. This MOOTW instruction involves decision-making practical exercises (PE's) at the company and battalion level for humanitarian assistance operations as well as examining current MOOTW doctrine and concepts. As with the BOC for second lieutenants, the resident AWS for captains emphasizes more "traditional" MAGTF operations and military skills as the bulk of the curriculum. This emphasis on traditional combat operations is manifested by the majority of instructional time placed upon subjects such as: writing operation orders, conducting battalion level defensive and offensive operations, command and control, fire support planning, amphibious ship-to-shore landings, and extensive battle studies on historical military operations. Again, such instruction does have crossover application to the MOOTW environment, but like the BOC, there is a relative dearth of dedicated MOOTW specific instruction in this formal curriculum.

The non-resident AWS course curriculum is similar to the resident course in its proportion of MOOTW specific subjects. This correspondence course offers a MOOTW instructional module that requires 16 study hours out of the 335 required for the entire

non-resident AWS course. By comparison, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College curriculum, the career level PME for Marine majors, requires 36 study hours on MOOTW. (Marine Corps Institute, ACL 1999, dtd. 14 Dec 98) Thus, MOOTW specific training appears to increase as seniority increases in the Marine Corps. As a result, the company and platoon leaders (captains and lieutenants) are not receiving the same degree of formal MOOTW specific training as the battalion commanders and staffs (majors and lieutenant colonels).

This PME overview demonstrates the Marine Corps educational approach to preparing junior officers for leading platoons and companies. This approach is characterized by focusing on core warfighting capabilities and competencies that can apply across the spectrum of conflict. These core warfighting skills are viewed as the essential basis of an officer's development to be successful in any operational environment, including MOOTW. Consequently, traditional warfighting competencies are emphasized in company-grade PME with dedicated MOOTW specific training constituting a relatively minor portion of this PME curricula.

2. Formal Enlisted Development For MOOTW

The first step in enlisted leadership development is recruit training. This process concentrates on indoctrination and the transformation from civilian to Marine, but also provides the leadership foundation for enlisted small-unit leaders. Indeed the addition of the "Crucible" training event was designed with the MOOTW environment in mind. General Krulak explains the purpose of implementing this three-day training event:

The Crucible was not implemented because we found our tried and true methods of recruit training to be flawed. Nothing could be further from the truth. We developed the Crucible for two major reasons. The first is that we saw a change in the operating environment in which our Marines will be employed. Decentralized operations, high-technology, increasing weapons lethality, asymmetric threats, the mixing of combatants and non-combatants and urban combat will be the order of the day vice the exception in the 21st Century. Our Marines must be good decision-makers. (*Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1997, p. 1)

At the earliest stage of enlisted leader development, then, the Marine Corps provides training for the environmental characteristics of MOOTW.

However, the concentration on environmental characteristics of MOOTW does appear to diminish as Marines enter their occupational specialties. Enlisted MOS schools are similar to officer schools in teaching Marines to be the duty experts in their particular field. Consequently, the degree of focus on MOOTW specific education and development is a function of operational specialty and school. These schools focus on job skills rather than leadership development.

Another phase in the development of small-unit leaders is career level PME for NCO's. This PME involves both resident and non-resident courses of instruction designed to "enhance the students skill of individual leadership qualities to discharge the duties and responsibilities of an Noncommissioned Officer in the Marine Corps." (MCU website, 1999) The resident course for sergeants contains the sub-courses of: (1) leadership and counseling, (2) military training, (3) unit training management, (4) weapons organic to the infantry battalion, and (5) warfighting skills and tactics. This course is primarily lecture oriented instruction involving mainly administrative leadership

functions of NCO's. It does not focus on tactical leadership decision-making skills in an operational environment such as MOOTW.

The non-resident required sergeant's course is similar to the resident course in its administrative focus. This course does have a leadership sub-course which

Presents the principles, traits, and indicators of leadership including the chain-of-command, the considerations and steps in setting unit tasks and standards, and the factors influencing motivation for better performances. Discusses balancing rewards and punishments, correlating performances with motivation and ability, recognizing problem areas, and identifying personal problems and their causes. Also discusses methods of identifying, evaluating, and selecting solutions, using referral agencies, and assisting subordinates in finding their own solutions. (Marine Corps Institute, *ACL 1999*, dtd. 14 Dec 98)

Sergeants are required to enroll in this course upon completion of the resident sergeant's course. The focus again appears to be on leadership skills and competencies required in basic troop leading and in garrison with no specific focus on decision-making in a tactical environment such as MOOTW. This general focus is no doubt due to the diversity of MOS's and skill requirements among enlisted NCO's. Because of this diversity of job-specific skills, these PME programs focus on principles and competencies universally required of all Marine NCO's.

An overview of Marine Corps PME for sergeants and corporals reveals a relative dearth of dedicated leadership instruction in the MOOTW environment. However, this PME is designed to develop troop leading skills necessary in all environments, so obvious cross-over of education and training to MOOTW is evident. So where are leadership skills specific to MOOTW developed? For the most part such development occurs in unit training. This training varies greatly from unit to unit and is mission and job dependent.

MOOTW specific training is only a small portion of PME at enlisted career level schools. As with the junior officer's curricula, the Marine Corps approaches enlisted PME as developing warfighting skills for the entire spectrum of conflict and thus traditional warfighting tasks make up the bulk of formal educational courses. Examination of recent operational experience may yield some insight into the effectiveness of such an educational approach and the applicability of this PME to MOOTW.

C. SUMMARY

Major General S.L. Arnold, commander of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) in Somalia, concluded from his operational experience that "well-trained, combat-ready, disciplined soldiers can easily adapt to peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions." (*Military Review*, Dec 1998, p. 73) The Marine Corps approaches leadership development at the tactical level with this same philosophy. An overview of structured PME and junior leader training reveals that training for traditional warfighting skills is the focus of small-unit leadership development. Marine Corps training and education at the tactical level concentrates on preparing leaders to conduct warfighting tasks across the spectrum of conflict with limited focus on the unique aspects of MOOTW. The framework the Corps uses is that training Marines for combat operations gives them the foundation necessary to flex and adapt warfighting skills for MOOTW as part of the "Three Block War." The validity of this approach is tested by examining tactical lessons learned in the next section.

IV. TACTICAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM MOOTW

A. OVERVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODS

Although, examining doctrine, professional military education, and unit training is essential to understanding the Marine Corps organizational view of MOOTW and how Marine leaders prepare for MOOTW, analyzing lessons learned from operational experience is important to evaluate the Marine Corps' effectiveness in this preparation. Experiential lessons also provide insight into future operational requirements. Consequently, this section examines recent Marine Corps MOOTW operations to derive key leadership competencies for future MOOTW leaders.

This research focuses on tactical lessons learned that have relevance to small-unit leadership development. The research method employed is a qualitative examination of tactical level lessons. These lessons are then categorized into common experiential themes that have implications to junior leader development in the Marine Corps.

Research sources include the official Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) data, first-person accounts by operational participants published in both books and professional journals, and historical studies and research by government and academic agencies. These MCLLS data are in the active and archival database for after-action reporting maintained on CD-ROM and distributed to battalion and squadron sized units.

B. TACTICAL LEADERSHIP LESSONS

In researching the small-unit leadership lessons from a variety of MOOTW, some themes for future leadership development emerged. These are: (1) developing a specific

mindset for leadership roles during MOOTW, (2) developing leaders and decision-making skills for the complex environment of MOOTW, and (3) preparing junior leaders to act autonomously in small teams in a decentralized environment. These three themes are used to organize the qualitative lessons learned data presented below.

1. Leadership Mindset and Roles For MOOTW

In this examination of tactical level lessons, a distinctive leadership mindset emerged that junior leaders need in order to facilitate their effectiveness in the varied leadership roles required in the MOOTW environment. This mindset for MOOTW is characterized by the necessity for restrained use of military force, recognizing the distinct moral dilemmas posed by MOOTW, understanding the importance of winning the support of the local populace, and preparing to use negotiating skills as an alternative to combat power.

The first aspect of this MOOTW mindset for junior leaders is the doctrinal principle of restraint. (*Joint Pub 3-07*) Kenneth Allard's (1995) study of lessons from Operation RESTORE HOPE summarizes this principle, stating that "restraint is an acquired skill, but it is the *sine qua non* of peace operations." (p. 62) A MCLLS (June 1990) submitted from Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama echoes Allard's lesson. The Marine units involved in this operation state that "a large part of understanding the low-intensity conflict (LIC) environment is a mindset or attitude. That part of the predeployment training should include LIC awareness, particularly the need for greater restraint and vigilance than may be required in other combat situations." (MCLLS, PROMOTE LIBERTY, June 1990).

A large part of exercising restraint is following established rules of engagement (ROE). Implementing and adhering to ROE poses another challenge to the MOOTW leadership mindset which is revealed in tactical lessons. Clarence Briggs (1990) discusses the complexity of this role in his experiences as a platoon leader during Operation JUST CAUSE. He notes that although ROE "provide some guidance," concepts involved such as "self-defense," "minimum force," "selected marksmen," and "innocent civilians" are often ambiguous in practice. All of these terms used in his particular ROE for this MOOTW are inherent in the concept of restrained use of force. He noted that "perhaps a six-week course would have sufficed in clarification, but time did not permit us that luxury." (p. 28) Thus, the principle of restraint may need increased focus as a leadership competency necessary to adjust to changing ROE during the variety of MOOTW missions.

Lessons from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (1991) reiterate the mindset of exercising restraint and adhering to ROE. The guidance provided to Marines in this humanitarian assistance operation in northern Iraq was outlined in the "Commander's Guidance for the Use of Force." This guidance stated that the first rule for commanders was: "PROVIDE COMFORT is a humanitarian relief operation, not a combat operation and personnel should conduct themselves in an appropriate manner. The rule stressed that the allies were in northern Iraq to give assistance not to start a war." (History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1995, p. 72)

Certainly this mindset differs subtly from some training junior Marines receive as warfighters. What is the "appropriate manner" in which a trained combat troop should

conduct oneself in these operations? Infantrymen are taught to close with and destroy the enemy from the first days of training. The mindset necessary in PROVIDE COMFORT was a departure from this training and required subsequent adjustments in leadership styles and roles. Of course, *Warfighting* as a philosophy for training junior Marines addresses adjusting levels of force across the different spectrums of conflict. This lesson from PROVIDE COMFORT reveals that the flexibility of thought inherent in maneuver warfare may require increased emphasis in preparing for the MOOTW environment.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT provides a further lesson into the different mindset needed to exercise restraint. The Marines involved were providing humanitarian assistance in a hostile nation that had just been defeated in combat operations. While Operation DESERT STORM had concluded, the Iraqi forces in the vicinity retained combat power substantially greater than the Marines involved in PROVIDE COMFORT. If restraint was not exercised and a conflict erupted, the Marines were outmanned and outgunned. In the words of one Marine involved, "the MEU has enough combat power to get into a fight, but may not have enough to finish the job." (History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1995, p. 57) This precarious situation placed even greater burdens on all leaders to exercise restraint to avoid conflict. Again, this mindset can be alien to junior warfighters if not properly trained and developed for such situations.

Another tactical lesson from MOOTW having implications on maintaining a mindset of restrained use of force is crowd and riot control. A MCLLS from a tactical leader during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (1994) in Haiti noted that "on two occasions large crowds of Haitians became unruly and out of control while waiting at

food distribution sites. Marines on the scene acting as security, lost control and were unable to maintain control due to a deficiency in planning.” (MCLLS, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1994) Exercising restrained use of military force in an out of control environment such as this situation in Haiti requires strong leadership skills at the tactical level. Marines undergo a test of self-discipline to not resort to military force when felt threatened by a chaotic situation such as unruly, hungry civilians attempting to attain food and supplies the Marines are tasked with securing.

Tactical MCLLS from Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia reveal similar experiences in exercising restraint when the local populace becomes unruly during relief operations. One such lesson pointed out how junior leaders needed to improvise in order to exercise restraint as an alternative to force. In one case tactical units used local “prickly shrub bushes” to cordon off a distribution point to stabilize a unsettled situation. Leaders need to be prepared to situationally adapt in finding alternatives to military force to maintain restraint in MOOTW. Such improvisational thinking is a large part of maintaining a flexible mental model that can be applied to diverse, unpredictable situations faced at the small-unit level. Again, Marines revert to training in times of crisis, so training to a flexible mental model is essential in implementing minimum force solutions in MOOTW.

Troops ability to adapt a mindset of restraint vice imposition of force is often a function of their discipline and feeling of security. Leadership is important in providing the cultural awareness of the environment necessary for troops to feel secure in their operations. A MCLLS from RESTORE HOPE pointed out that “as Marines interacted

with the local populace it became evident that they did not have a high comfort factor with cultural interaction. Only through self discipline and judgement were they able to keep tempers and emotions in check.” (MCLLS, Restore Hope, 1994)

This MCLLS illustrates another important aspect of the leadership mindset required in recent MOOTW: being prepared to deal with the individual moral conflicts that emerge in these missions. RESTORE HOPE is replete with accounts of troops becoming stressed because of the moral aspects of the operation. Colonel Gilbert Harper, USA, (1993) recounts some of the moral stresses experienced by the troops he led during this operation. He notes that troops are used to dealing with the deployment stresses of field duty, physical exertion and separation from family, but that “the real stress came from having to deal with needs beyond their ability to fill. They had to defend themselves against people they came to help.” (*Military Review*, 1993, p. 78)

He used an example of a small-unit who had a mission to proceed through a small village when a firefight broke out. He notes,

The soldiers handled the situation well and were not bothered by the fire. The cause of their stress was that women with children begged them not to leave but to stay and protect them from the fighting. The soldiers were torn between their mission and what they considered to be a moral obligation to help. They continued with the mission, but the conflict stayed with them. (Harper, 1993, p. 78)

Colonel Harper then speaks of the leadership necessary to deal with these moral dilemmas. He asks:

How can leaders keep them (their troops) from becoming indifferent to human suffering and converting the Somalis into an enemy? The first step was to ensure that our soldiers recognized that they were caught in a moral dilemma and that it was perfectly natural to be upset by it...We made every

effort to inform soldiers of the positive signs of our successes... We also made every effort to ensure that soldiers did not think of the Somalis as enemies...The restraint our soldiers displayed under extremely tough conditions was remarkable, and their resiliency to repeated deployments is outstanding. We as leaders, however, must continue to recognize the stresses they face and minimize them as much as possible. (Harper, 1993, p. 79)

The leadership required to minimize such stresses in these morally ambiguous missions ultimately may come through actual experience. However, using training and mission briefs to increase troops' awareness of the moral and ethical dilemmas they will face may aid in instilling the mindset Col. Harper believes facilitates leadership success in these MOOTW.

The moral dilemmas faced by young troops are further illustrated in Mark Bowden's (1999) account of the October 3, 1993 battle in Mogadishu. Despite the fact that this was a full-scale firefight, the soldiers involved still wrestled with the morality of their mission. One soldier shot and killed a Somali who was armed but was departing his immediate vicinity. He recounts this soldier's feelings:

He had killed a man. It troubled him. The man had not actually been trying to kill him when he fired, so in the purest sense it wasn't self-defense. So how could he justify what he had just done? He watched the man in the dirt, his clothes tangled around him, splayed awkwardly where the bullets had felled him. A life, like his, ended. Was this the right thing? (*Blackhawk Down*, p. 42)

Moral aspects have always impacted combat. However, the unique situations of MOOTW— where missions are non-traditional and “enemies” are often ambiguous— have unique moral and ethical implications for developing leadership skills necessary to cope with the dilemmas of this environment.

Some unit leaders have experienced difficulty with the moral dilemmas involved in MOOTW. During UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, an Army captain was court-martialed because he violated orders in dealing with the local Haitian authorities. This captain sought to end what he suspected were human rights abuses in the Haitian prisons in his area by taking actions in violation of direct and legal orders from his superiors. (Fishel, 1997) This lesson learned reveals that sometimes applications of personal standards of morality in a foreign culture can cause significant problems for junior leaders during highly political missions. Thus moral and ethical standards of what will and will not be tolerated during MOOTW must be delineated by leaders in much the same way as ROE. ROE of course apply in MOOTW, but often times the ethical and moral standards of conduct are not as clearly delineated as the tactical actions leaders are required to follow.

An important part of exercising restraint and coping with moral dilemmas is winning the support of the local population which is critical to successful operations. Small-unit leaders placed in difficult security situations often used the goodwill of the locals to both decrease the threat of attack from locals as well as to use them as an intelligence source. Marine platoons in RESTORE HOPE used medical care, food distribution and security patrols between rival ethnic clan boundaries to engender goodwill. A platoon leader in this operation noted that such small-unit efforts facilitated success and force security. He recalls, "Without the locals on our side we would have lost our main source of intelligence along with our justification for being there." (*Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep. 94, p. 76-77)

Winning the support of the local populace often required another role for the junior leader in MOOTW: the negotiator. Allard (1995) found the following lesson from his study of the Somalia MOOTW, "At all levels during Somalia operations, negotiating skills and techniques were essential to mission accomplishment. As Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni said, 'Always consider negotiations as a great alternative to violence.'" (p. 71) Negotiating skills may be required at the junior leadership levels in traditional warfighting operations, but the increased contact with the local populace and intermingling of combatants and non-combatants in humanitarian operations and MOOTW place an even greater premium in developing these skills for these operations.

Allard quotes *Joint Pub 3-07.3* that in addition to the qualities of patience and restraint, peacekeepers must combine:

an approachable, understanding and tactful manner with fairness and firmness. A professional demeanor that stresses quiet diplomacy and reasoning will achieve more than arrogance, anger, disdain, coercion, or sarcasm. Personnel must be able to cope positively when each side seeks to press its position and then reacts vocally when stopped. (p. 71)

Allard notes that "these qualities are clearly part of an attitude adjustment from the reactions traditionally associated with military operations: but there should be no mistaking how important that adjustment is during peace operations." (p. 71)

Tactical lessons from operations bear this out. In JUST CAUSE, a company commander found himself standing between his company and Panamanian force, both sides with loaded weapons, negotiating passage for his company to continue their mission. (Briggs, 1990, p. 29) A platoon leader during RESTORE HOPE speaks of the

varying levels of negotiating he and his Marines used in patrolling between two ethnic factions:

In all the dealings with the locals, it was essential that Marines appeared calm, confident, and friendly. Visible nervousness on our part was a major problem at first. At the same time when confronted with a hostile act, it was essential to act quickly and aggressively – hardly a new lesson, but one worth emphasizing. (*Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep. 1994, p. 77)

These different demeanor on the part of Marines in varying circumstances are an important aspect of negotiating with the local populace.

Another small-unit leader during RESTORE HOPE submitted a lesson learned on negotiating skills at the tactical level. He noted in a MCLLS (1993),

On three different cordon and search operations, meetings took place with the town elders. Discussion/negotiations with town elders can be an interesting and frustrating experience. Be patient...Be direct, respectful and talk through your interpreter. The elders quickly announce your force's intentions, and their credibility and position in the community reduce tensions between the people and your force. (RESTORE HOPE MCLLS, 1993)

Clearly, well developed negotiating skills at the tactical level can facilitate operational success and have implications for leadership development of tactical leaders. These skills are deemed such an important aspect of MOOTW success that Army Major General Montgomery recommended that they be addressed at formal Army schools. (Allard, 1995, p. 72)

Junior leaders need to understand that their leadership roles in MOOTW may be different than traditional warfighting missions for which they have trained. MOOTW, then, involves preparing junior leaders with a specific mindset for coping with its inherent characteristics. This mindset includes the necessity for restrained use of military force,

recognizing the moral dilemmas associated with MOOTW in order to provide awareness in the absence of experience, understanding the importance of winning the support of the local populace, and preparing to use negotiation as an alternative to combat power. Developing this mindset comes with knowledge of the characteristics of MOOTW and must be consciously ingrained into junior leaders.

2. Decision-Making in a Complex Environment

Examining lessons learned reveal a second thematic category: MOOTW represent complex, unpredictable environments for junior leaders demanding decisiveness in the absence of specific mission preparation and/or experience. Certain tactical considerations distinctive to the MOOTW environment place a premium on the adaptability of junior decision-makers because of this dynamic, confusing environment. One such distinctive characteristic of MOOTW is the increasing intermingling of combatants and non-combatants. The ambiguity of who may be a potential adversary impacts the ability of junior leaders to make sound, timely tactical level decisions in MOOTW.

One infantry unit involved in RESTORE HOPE submitted a MCLLS (1993) addressing the need of Marine Corps urban training to better focus on the characteristics of MOOTW:

Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) training in the Marine Corps is geared towards a high-intensity environment. MOUT is taught as an extremely dangerous situation where the optimum integration of combat power is desired in order to overwhelm and destroy the enemy. In Somalia, combat power was deemphasized in order to portray a non-confrontational posture, often resulting in a confusing environment where Marines executed missions for which they may not have received adequate training nor were psychologically prepared for. (MCLLS, RESTORE HOPE, 1993)

The lesson learned from this experience is to:

Plan for the identification of targets, and appropriate levels of force to respond to those threats. Plan for redirecting interference from large numbers of curious civilians...Although we are not trained to be policemen, we found ourselves continually performing police type missions. (MCLLS, RESTORE HOPE, 1993)

The urban training given to small-unit leaders is one key to developing sound decision-making skills required in these fluid environments. Operational experience has shown that tactical training such as MOUT may need to be refocused for MOOTW participation. Further evidence that training for tactical skills may not provide the ultimate solution for developing sound decision-making is discussed by the Marine commander during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY:

If Haiti offers any indication, future scenarios will be characterized by uncertainty, disorder and ambiguity. No formula of specific solutions will apply; leaders will have to adjust to absolute uncertainty. Training shortcuts and quick fixes will not help Marines learn to cope with this environment. "Flip-a-switch" or "teach-a-class" solutions are poor substitutes for training evolutions that subject Marines to increasing mental and physical stress. (*Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1995, p. 59)

This comment emphasizes the need for field training which simulates the stresses of MOOTW vice classroom training and briefings embodied in the terms "flip-a-switch" and "teach-a-class." Training for skills such as MOUT must then incorporate not only the tactical skills required of an infantryman, but also development of the mental processes to cope with this confusing environment.

Other operational lessons speak to the confusion of this particular combat environment. A soldier involved in the Mogadishu battle on October 3, 1993 describes a

situation where he was confronted with a Somali gunman shooting at his unit from behind women and children, using them as his shield. (*Blackhawk Down*, 1999, p. 46)

Tactical training in the Marine Corps cannot predict all such situations these small-unit leaders must react to. As a result of such situational diversity, sound judgement in employing military force by tactical leaders is a necessity. In situations such as those encountered in Mogadishu, training at the tactical level must simulate these dynamic situations, and exercising judgement and decision-making must be emphasized as much as tactical warfighting skills.

Another aspect of the MOOTW environment is the rapid changing of mission taskings to warfighting units. Marine Corps units can be called at any time to execute missions for which they have not been specifically trained. MCLLS from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Los Angeles (SPMAGTFLA) reveal comments such as “domestic civil disturbance operations were unexpected. Annual training in these operations must become a standard practice.” (MCLLS, 1998) In a situation like the Los Angeles riots, who is a combatant? Are there even any “combatants?” These type missions tax the adaptability of Marine Corps units training for traditional warfighting missions.

Further examination of this domestic operation reveals actions by senior leaders to facilitate success such as issuing detailed ROE instructions. ROE and other specific guidance from above can provide some explicit direction for small unit leaders who are called upon to execute these unplanned, unexpected missions. Often in MOOTW, these instructions take the form of a briefing and a ROE card for junior leaders to carry. But

comments from the MCLLS show that in a fluid environment, “the cards are not to be used when Marines are on watch or patrol. Training takes over at that point.” (MCLLS, SPMAGTFLA, 1998) Consequently, issuing detailed guidance during an operation does not provide the utility of always “leaning forward” and planning for the unexpected.

3. Decentralization of Command Requiring Autonomous Action

A final category for these tactical lessons learned can be characterized as a dispersed environment where junior leaders must act without higher supervision. Humanitarian relief operations such as SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh, PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq, and RESTORE HOPE in Somalia involved numerous dispersed security areas and relief distribution points manned by small units. Such dispersion in austere environments necessitates timely decisions by small-unit leaders because of the limited communication linkages and rapidly unfolding situations where time does not allow for direction from higher authority.

Confusion and fluidity reign in the descriptions of these humanitarian relief operations and improvised solutions are often generated on the spot by junior leaders. One MCLLS from PROVIDE COMFORT discusses a pilot’s use of a hovering helicopter to disperse crowds from mobbing a food distribution point. Again, judgement and adaptability by junior Marines ensured security and order in a potentially chaotic situation.

A Rand study of lessons learned from Operation JUST CAUSE also emphasizes the small-unit flexibility necessary in these fluid MOOTW:

In most OOTW the battlefield is nonlinear, and units may be dispersed in cities or over a vast area, as in Somalia. Small units must therefore be more self-sufficient. Accordingly, standard leadership training and reinforcement of initiative extended to younger officers and small-unit leaders should continue. Training in special skills that increase the flexibility of small units should also be undertaken. (Taw, *Operation Just Cause: Lessons for OOTW*, 1996, p. 32)

In peacekeeping and stabilization efforts, force presence is a major method employed by military forces to ensure a secure environment for relief efforts and in restoring and preserving civil order. The simple presence of military units in MOOTW often provides a deterrent to potential adversaries and civilians who can disrupt the orderly distribution of relief supplies or cause civil unrest for personal or political advantage. Such motives can include obtaining relief supplies for one side of domestic disputes at the expense of rival domestic groups. In humanitarian relief operations for example, the ethnic or political faction who controls the food supplies can control the local population. Military presence provides the deterrent necessary to ensure equitable distribution of relief supplies and the maintenance of civil order necessary for mission success.

Small, flexible, independent units, operating autonomously, have been shown to be keys to success in these presence operations inherent in many MOOTW. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti illustrated the importance of force presence to attaining mission objectives. An Institute For National Strategic Studies review of this operation underlined the use of presence operations. US Atlantic Command identified three factors most threatening to civil order and a safe and secure environment in Haiti:

violence, instability, and poor infrastructure. Consequently, force presence was employed to prevent violence:

The multi-national force (MNF) aggressively neutralized sources of violence. An aggressive and constant force presence was maintained in Port-au-Prince, characterized by frequent street patrols on foot and by vehicle. Platoon and company-size patrols were conducted to outlying cities and towns by helicopter or small boats. Special Forces units established a presence in rural areas...The MNF also implemented a vigorous program to protect government buildings and routes between them. Bodyguards were not provided to Haitian officials, but frequent and highly visible mobile patrols provided a psychological deterrent to the use of violence by Haitians against Haitians. (*INSS Strategic Forum* #78, June 1996, p. 3)

This dispersion of forces throughout the operational environment is characteristic of most MOOTW. The Marine commander in Haiti underscores the importance of the small-unit leaders in these presence operations:

Motorized and foot patrols led by young officers and, staff non-commissioned officers (SNCO's) and NCO's were everywhere as were the TOW's (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided missile vehicles), heavy machineguns, and LAV's (light-armored vehicles). The efforts of the young leaders and their men who drove the streets and walked the darkened alleys to ensure the safety of the populace cannot be praised enough; these Marines and sailors now clearly know the meaning of uncertainty. (*Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1995, p. 57)

With this dispersal of forces and firepower, the criticality of autonomous action by small-units, and small-unit leaders, is an important lesson learned from this operation. The multitude of small-unit patrols described in these MOOTW are often unique when compared to the large-scale unit combat involved in more traditional combat operations.

In this decentralized environment, many of the tactical lessons learned focus on the concept of commander's intent as imperative to mission success. A MCLLS from

RESTORE HOPE states,

Decision-making by the individual Marine on the spot will become commonplace, uncontrollable at higher levels of command by any means other than mission and commander's intent. This is not surprising as it is communicated well in our *Warfighting* doctrine. Training for this type of role is an advancement of decentralized, infiltration type tactics and techniques. Use of the TDG (tactical decision game), putting young leaders in situations and scenarios where the decision on what to do, and how to do it, must become commonplace. (MCLLS, RESTORE HOPE, 1993)

Commander's intent lessons were also learned in the domestic civil disturbance operation in Los Angeles. A MCLLS from this operation states,

In hostile situations where immediate response is required to safeguard lives, the small unit leader will need to make on-the-spot decisions. Such decisions may require immediate (violent) response and reaction without acquiring guidance or concurrence from higher authority. This decentralization of command is inevitable in urban environments. Commander's intent and the application of the rules of engagement must be clearly understood by all small-unit leaders. (MCLLS, SPMAGTF LA, 1992)

The lessons learned by these tactical leaders are indicative of the challenges faced during MOOTW by junior Marines. The implications of these lessons on Marine Corps leadership development will be the focus of the following section.

C. CURRENT AND FUTURE SMALL-UNIT LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

Synthesizing the views of MOOTW from the doctrinal examination with the tactical lessons learned from recent experience results in some competencies for future small-unit leaders. Recall the themes derived from the doctrinal examination:

- The criticality and centrality of the small-unit leader to MOOTW success,
- The primacy of political considerations,
- The diverse types of mission tasks involved in the myriad of MOOTW,

and

- A decision-making environment where junior leaders must exercise judgement in the absence of direct higher supervision.

Now the thematic categories of the tactical lessons learned:

- Developing a specific mindset-- characterized by the necessity for restrained use of military force, recognizing the distinct moral dilemmas posed by MOOTW, understanding the importance of winning the support of the local populace, and preparing to use negotiating skills as an alternative to combat power-- for leadership roles during MOOTW,
- Developing leaders and decision-making skills for the complex environment of MOOTW, and
- Preparing junior leaders and small-units to act autonomously in a decentralized environment.

Comparing the doctrinal viewpoints of MOOTW and the themes derived from tactical lessons shows commonality that can be integrated into leadership requirements for future junior leaders. These small-unit leadership capabilities and competencies can be summarized into these three key areas: (1) ability to adapt leadership roles to diverse environments, (2) independent decision-making skills for decentralized operations, and (3) ability to develop leadership skills in team members.

1. Adapting Leadership Roles to Diverse Environments

Both the doctrinal examination and tactical lessons demonstrate the importance of Marine leaders at all levels to be multi-skilled, cross-trained warriors. Every Marine remains a rifleman, as the saying goes, but every Marine leader must also be versed in other skills required in MOOTW. Operational experience reveals that small-unit leaders must also be logisticians, public relations experts, supporting arms coordinators, intelligence collectors, military policemen, and possess skills in cultural awareness and sensitivity. In the decentralized environment of MOOTW, the traditional task

organization of Marine units may not provide such experts at the small-unit level.

Consequently, the burden of managing these different roles is thrust upon the junior leader.

The roles required of junior leaders are explicitly drawn from recent experiential lessons. Lessons learned describe small-unit leaders as negotiators, policemen, security guards, humanitarian workers, liaison officers, and warriors. These roles change as the situations change in the "Three Block War." The diversity of stakeholders—refugees, local officials, rival clan leaders, NGO workers, foreign military members, media, and politicians, among others – requires different leadership techniques and roles in order to successfully interact and operate in the MOOTW environment.

Attention has also been given to the changing moral aspects of conducting MOOTW missions. The moral conflicts created by ambiguous threats, the intermingling of combatants and civilians, and the perceived conflict between mission priority and moral obligations have all emerged from tactical experience. In traditional combat operations where definitive lines could be drawn between friend and adversary, Marines could better focus on warfighting skills and missions. MOOTW leaders require moral vigilance in all actions due to the strategic implications of their actions and the ever-present spotlight of modern media. Brigadier General Blackman (1998), President of Marine Corps University, highlights the increased emphasis on the role of moral leader in future conflicts:

21st Century leaders will not just have to be technically and tactically proficient. They will need more than ever to understand the moral dimensions of our profession and be well-grounded in the values and

virtues necessary to make the right decisions for the right reasons. (Naval Postgraduate School, 1998)

The importance of restraint points to another mindset shift from traditional combat operations. Doctrine delineates restraint as a principle of MOOTW, but not as a principle of war. In fact, the principle of mass, a well understood principle of war to which warfighters train, can be seen as contradictory to restraint. Since Marine warriors are trained in implementing the principles of war, but are also tasked with conducting MOOTW, different roles for different mission types needs to be part of the leadership development process. Recognizing these changing roles and the required shift in mindset based on mission is part of this development process.

2. Independent Decision-Making Skills For Decentralized Operations

The second key competency revealed by examining doctrinal views and tactical lessons is the ability to make decisions in the absence of higher supervision. Numerous tactical lessons describe the MOOTW environment as highly dispersed, requiring independent decision-making by junior leaders. In fact, decentralized, uncertain environments are an inherent aspect of the Marine Corps' view of the "Three Block War." As a result, small-unit leader decision-making in such an environment is a leadership necessity for successful MOOTW.

Developing these decision-making skills in junior Marines involves all facets of the leadership development process. Many of the tactical lessons examined focus on realistic MOOTW training as a key component. Responsibility for this development is also placed up the chain-of-command on more senior leaders to delegate trust and

confidence in junior leaders during both training and contingency operations. Lessons learned emphasize the doctrinal concept of commander's intent as critical to instilling the confidence in junior leaders to act independently and decisively.

Education is a large portion of such leadership training. General Blackman underscores the responsibility of Marine trainers and educators in this leadership development:

Leaders at the very lowest level will have to be confident and savvy enough to take needed actions not necessarily spelled out in their orders; and generals will have to be skilled in articulating guidance and intent, and confident enough in the training and education we've provided young leaders to trust them. (Naval Postgraduate School, 1998, p. 2-42)

His viewpoint as a Marine Corps educator is supported by the operational lessons examined. Most of the MOOTW discussed involved large scale presence operations with small-units dispersed throughout the operating area, requiring the proper use of commander's intent for unity of effort. Compounding the criticality of sound judgement and decision-making by these junior Marines are the compressed levels of warfare in MOOTW. Poor decisions by junior leaders can have strategic implications that impact overall mission success in MOOTW. Thus, preparing these leaders for independent action in a decentralized environment is critical.

3. Ability to Develop Leadership Skills in Team Members

In addition to developing their own personal independent decision-making skills, junior leaders in MOOTW must be accomplished in the leadership development of team members. As the recent history of military operations other than war have demonstrated, small teams of all military specialities are on the front-lines of these missions. Even

small-unit leaders will not always be present in supervisory roles of their unit members when actions with high-level implications may be taken by individuals in these units. Units must evolve as teams with a unity of shared purpose so that autonomy of action by individuals does not conflict with overall mission objectives.

In the "Three Block War," missions and environments vary greatly even within a single MOOTW operation. A huge leadership burden is already placed upon small-unit leaders to vary leadership roles and strategies to cope with this changing environment. Without the support of a cohesive team, this leadership challenge is magnified. In order to ease this leadership burden, highly effective teamwork by all Marines at the small-unit level is essential.

Not only must junior leaders be able to interpret guidance from above, they must also be able to effectively utilize the concept of commander's intent to cultivate support and unity of effort in their subordinate team members. This competency of developing team members may require a focus on empowering unit members at levels below fire-team level that is not necessarily seen in traditional combat operations. The vagaries of MOOTW reveal the utility of developing the discussed leadership capabilities down to the lowest levels of supervision. Platoon leaders, squad leaders and even fire-team leaders facilitate MOOTW success by developing the same or similar leadership competencies in their subordinates who frequently operate autonomously in these missions. This type of development needs to be a continuous process by exercising empowerment and delegation throughout a Marine's training cycle and leadership development.

D. SUMMARY

The integration of the doctrinal examination of MOOTW and the tactical lessons learned has yielded these three key areas of leadership development:

- Adapting Leadership Roles to Diverse Environments
- Independent Decision-Making Skills For Decentralized Operations
- Ability to Develop Leadership Skills in Team Members

Developing these skills in small-unit leaders can provide the Marine Corps with the leadership at all levels of command to continue to be successful in future MOOTW.

The development of these key leadership areas is no small task, and traditional Marine Corps leader development models may require refinement. Marine Corps training and education is constantly evaluated for focus and relevance to changing operating environments such as MOOTW. A subsequent application of three theoretical leadership development models to lessons learned and MOOTW doctrine is presented in the following chapter. The intention is to provide insight into methods and skills trainers and educators can use to aid in developing these leadership competencies for the Marine Corps' future MOOTW leaders.

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V. ANALYSIS OF LESSONS LEARNED USING THEORETICAL MODELS FOR LEADER DEVELOPMENT

A. OVERVIEW

Academic and management research has many leadership models and frameworks that the Marine Corps can examine to improve Marine Corps leadership development. This section reviews three important leadership models to provide insight for developing small-unit leadership competencies derived from the doctrinal examination of MOOTW and the tactical lessons learned. The integration of this doctrinal examination and the experiential lessons resulted in three key competencies for small-unit leaders in MOOTW:

- Adapting Leadership Roles to Diverse Environments
- Independent Decision-Making Skills For Decentralized Operations
- Ability to Develop Leadership Skills in Team Members

As a result, theoretical research on leadership development is reviewed with these competencies in mind. The purpose of this review is to describe and analyze models that can provide Marines with better understanding of developing these MOOTW leadership necessities.

B. ANALYSIS

1. Competing Values Model

The first framework, Robert Quinn's (1988) *Competing Values Model*, (Figure 1) is divided into four quadrants representing the four major models in established organization theory. The vertical axis of his model ranges from flexibility to control and

the horizontal axis from an internal to an external focus. Each quadrant has a polar opposite within the framework. For example, the human relations model, which emphasizes flexibility and internal focus, contrasts with the rational goal model, which stresses control and external focus.

Quinn calls this framework the competing values model because of the apparent contradictions in the messages of the four quadrant models. His research notes that organizations want to be flexible and adaptable, but they also desire stability and control. Also, organizations such as the Marine Corps must value their human resources and emphasize morale and cohesion, but must also concentrate on efficiency, productivity and goal setting. Figure 1 portrays Quinn's competing values framework at the organizational level.

This competing values framework suggests that these oppositions can mutually exist in an organizational system. In fact Quinn believes that organizational effectiveness increases when organizations reflect more than simply one of the four models illustrated in his framework. In an organization such as the Marine Corps, where recent MOOTW experience has shown a wide diversity of tasks and environmental factors, this framework illustrates the competing values which individuals in the organization may need to balance in order to maintain organizational effectiveness.

Leaders in organizations must not overly focus on one set of values in the model at the expense of neglecting the other value sets. Quinn's conclusion in using his model as a diagnostic tool for organizational effectiveness is that ineffective organizations have not developed the capacity to simultaneously pursue these opposite values to meet

important challenges. Such a diagnostic tool can provide insight into the Marine Corps' effectiveness in preparing its members for MOOTW where the dynamic environment may require any or all of the competing values portrayed in this model.

In fact, this organizational effectiveness model can be applied throughout the Marine Corps down to the small-unit level. The Marine Corps organizational structure is hierarchical with a well-defined chain-of-command. Units within this structure often have centralized, integrated authority and decision-making. In garrison and peacetime training exercises, such centralized decision-making is used to maintain unit control. In contrast the lessons learned demonstrated that MOOTW become highly decentralized with small units acting autonomously and making decisions of great operational impact. In MOOTW, small-units –from the company to the fire-team– must be prepared to operate toward the decentralization and flexibility axis of the model. Such an organizational value must compete with the centralization and control often found in garrison and training exercises. The Marine Corps must prepare junior leaders to manage these competing values of traditional hierarchical structure and control in peacetime with the decentralization and flexibility required in MOOTW.

Another application of Quinn's competing values framework is in the area of leadership roles (Figure 2). Quinn believes his framework makes it possible to see management behavior in genuinely new ways. Four aspects of this leadership model have application to understanding the leadership requirements drawn out in the tactical lessons from MOOTW. They are: (1) *clarifying perceptual bias*, (2) *making values explicit*, (3) *having a dynamic focus*, and (4) *shifting from either/or to both/and thinking*.

Clarifying perceptual bias means that the framework makes clear that there are perceptual biases that influence how managers view social action. Managers are often times biased towards one leadership role over another, say director over mentor.

Perceptually, these roles may appear opposites in a manager's mind. Quinn recognizes this perception, and his framework graphically clarifies the oppositional nature of many managerial roles. He states,

Any point on one side of the diagram is in perceptual tension with any point on the opposite side of the diagram. Perceptually, we see these (roles) as very different behaviors, and we often treat them in a schismogenic way. That is, we see one as desirable and the other as not, or we concentrate on one and ignore the other entirely. (P. 85-87).

Quinn's point on clarifying perceptual bias toward these leadership roles applies to the tactical lessons learned. An important theme derived from the examination of lessons was developing a MOOTW mindset prior to operations. Recall small-unit leaders were forced into roles as negotiators, policemen, humanitarian workers, and security guards in addition to their traditional role as warrior. Important to establishing a mindset for MOOTW is realizing that many or all of these roles may occur, and leaders must not view these roles as mutually exclusive or be biased in believing one role is superior to another. Small-unit leaders can use this model to realize they must not be biased to one role, for example warrior, over another, say negotiator. The "Three Block War" requires leaders to utilize all these roles. The diverse environments and myriad tactical situations will dictate which role a leader will use in these fluid missions.

Quinn's framework clarifies these perceived managerial biases toward leadership roles by *making values explicit*. He believes the juxtaposition of one value with its opposite makes the meaning of the value even more explicit. Quinn uses the framework's quadrant system to make all underlying values clear and positively presented, thus indicating there is no assumed right answer or one best way to manage. Making potential leadership roles for junior leaders explicit will facilitate establishing a mindset for MOOTW which was an important lesson learned. Explicating these value differences also increases leader awareness of choosing an appropriate leadership strategy for specific situational characteristics in MOOTW. For example, emphasizing flexibility versus control or external focus versus internal focus based on the environmental dynamics.

The third area where Quinn's model provides insight into managerial behavior is its *dynamic focus*. The model portrays the tension managers have due to the competing values. The framework indicates need for diverse behaviors from managers, showing that there are no clear maps for problem detection and solution in a complex, unstructured environment. Indeed, the model calls for managerial behaviors to change depending on the situation and context.


Quinn notes that "a manager may engage in a set of behaviors reflecting one set of values at one point and in an entirely different set of values at another point." (1988, p. 88) The parallel of this framework to leadership in the "Three Block War" metaphor, where roles and behaviors constantly change with the situation, is apparent. This parallel is exemplified by the lesson from Operation RESTORE HOPE where a small-


unit leader stated "in all dealings with the locals, it was essential that Marines appeared calm, confident and friendly...At the same time when confronted with a hostile act, it was essential to act quickly and aggressively." (*Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep. 1994, p. 77)

Clearly the role of calm, friendly humanitarian provider is different from that of aggressive warfighter. Only accurate assessment of context can guide the junior leader to the appropriate role. Consequently, a dynamic focus is a necessary aspect of any leadership model which may provide insights into leadership approaches to MOOTW.

The final area Quinn believes his leadership model is useful in is moving *from either/or to both/and thinking*. Unlike some models, for example the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962) or McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y, this

Figure 5: Competing Values Framework: Effectiveness





model does not “place” a manager into a single quadrant or managerial style. The competing values framework allows for managerial behaviors to be located in any or all of the quadrants. Quinn emphasizes the point of not classifying a manager as an “X” or a “Y” stating that “while this point may seem unimportant, it is not. It implies a radically different approach to measurement with very different implications in terms of what we tell people about their management style.” (p. 89)

Quinn emphasizes that although the different leadership roles are often in tension, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the model indicates a leader can play roles simultaneously that are polar opposites. Quinn explains:

The elements (in each quadrant) are not opposites in a mutually exclusive sense like short and tall. Empirically, it is possible to engage in behaviors at two opposite points in the framework. It is possible, for example, to play both the innovator and coordinator roles or both the producer and facilitator roles. (P. 85)

With the multitude of roles Marine leaders must play in MOOTW, both/and thinking can aid these junior leaders in understanding the varied, fluid leadership required in these operations. Traditional Marine Corps leadership development has always emphasized that many different leadership styles can be effective. However, Quinn’s emphasis on both/and thinking in terms of leadership roles— not simply leadership style— may facilitate understanding of the previously discussed mindset required in the dynamic MOOTW environment. Indeed the tactical lessons examined were replete with examples of the different roles these junior leaders had to assume during the operations.

Quinn used the competing values framework to measure the effectiveness of managers and hypothesized what roles resulted in the most effective managers. The

implications of applying his model resulted in numerous conclusions from Quinn's research. Of particular relevance to this study of leadership in MOOTW is his main hypothesis of *the need for balance* in playing these leadership roles. In scoring qualitative surveys about managers, Quinn classified managers as either being ineffective or effective. His results reveal,

The ineffective profiles seem to fall into two groups. There are those who do poorly on nearly all the roles and those who exceed the mean on three or four roles... While the first are easy to classify as ineffective, the profiles in the second group are more complex. They appear to be both good and bad. Given that they are doing well on some roles, why are these groups seen as ineffective rather than effective? The issue seems one of balance. For the ineffective groups, the positive scores simply do not counterbalance the negative. (1988, p. 105)

The implications of this analysis of the competing values framework of leadership roles to the MOOTW leader are important. The lessons learned data reveal the variety of roles, diversity of stakeholders and fluid environment in MOOTW. Greater effectiveness by leaders at the tactical level may require balancing these diverse and often unfamiliar leadership roles with the more familiar role of warfighter. The doctrinal examination and experiential data from MOOTW revealed adaptation of leadership roles to diverse environments as a key area of leadership development. Quinn's research and model may help explicate the competing roles leaders must develop to be more effective in a dynamic environment.

His framework can also be useful in analyzing a different leadership approach at the junior level for MOOTW as opposed to traditional warfighting missions. Using his framework, leadership roles appear to move more towards the upper right quadrant,

emphasizing the innovator and broker roles in these diverse missions. While the roles of mentor and coordinator continue to be important in MOOTW, the focus of leadership appears to become more externally focused at the junior level than has traditionally been the case.

Even though a major tenet of *Warfighting* is "orienting on the enemy," (p. 76) in MOOTW the "enemy" is less clear than in traditional combat operations such as a major theater war. Consequently junior leaders must become even more externally focused during these missions. The data from the lessons learned reflect this shift. Recall the challenges of identifying adversaries, maintaining security and control, recognizing stakeholders and power sources, and generating unconventional solutions to these challenges. Also, the emphasis on using negotiating as an alternative to sheer military force at the junior level further demonstrated the increasing external focus these junior leaders must have to be effective.

In operations such as RESTORE HOPE and PROVIDE COMFORT, for example, Quinn's descriptions of the innovator and broker roles were required by junior Marines. Quinn describes the innovator as creative, clever and envisioning change. Lessons learned spoke of these traits being necessary at all levels of command for mission success. Certainly the broker role, being resource-oriented and politically astute, is reflected in the junior leader actions in Mogadishu, Haiti and Northern Iraq. Lessons learned perhaps focused more on these roles because they are indeed different from the roles played by junior Marines in traditional combat operations against a well-defined enemy military force.

Additionally, the lessons learned reflected a definite movement up Quinn's vertical axis from control to flexibility. Recall the experiential theme of decentralized command and control and the resulting requirement for autonomous action by junior leaders. The data described the dispersed security areas and relief distribution points which were manned by small units during humanitarian relief operations. Also described were the force presence operations conducted by small units in peacekeeping and stabilization missions. These experiences required flexibility by the junior leaders and units involved because of the impracticality, difficulty, or impossibility of retaining control at central levels above these small units. Consequently, the importance of the leadership roles in the upper right quadrant of Quinn's framework received greater emphasis in the tactical lessons learned.

2. Discipline of Teams

Another area of organizational research with important implications for military operations other than war examines characteristics and models of high performance teams. The earlier doctrinal review of MOOTW characteristics provided a common theme of the small-units being absolutely critical to operational success. The tactical lessons learned were replete with accounts of small teams operating independently "far from the flagpole." It follows that any review of academic writings should include research into what differentiates effective teams from ineffective groups.

Katzenbach and Smith (1993) studied "more than 50 different teams in 30 companies and beyond, from Motorola and Hewlett-Packard to Operation Desert Storm and the Girl Scouts" to find what differentiates various levels of performance among

teams. In observing both successes and failures in their research, Katzenbach and Smith derived a working definition of a "real team:"

A team is a small number of people with complementary skills who are committed to a common purpose, set of performance goals, and approach for which they hold themselves mutually accountable. (1993, p. 45)

This definition is certainly analogous to the small-unit teams that are the operators in military operations other than war. The doctrinal examination of MOOTW derived the theme of *a decision-making environment where junior leaders must exercise judgement in the absence of direct higher supervision*. Also, a thematic category from the experiential lessons data was *preparing junior leaders to act autonomously in small teams in a decentralized environment*. These two themes clearly emphasize the importance of effective teams to MOOTW success. Consequently, what characteristics of high-performance teams can be better developed in Marine small-units to increase effectiveness?

Many of Katzenbach and Smith's research conclusions on characteristics of high-performance teams are readily apparent in most, if not all, military teams. These characteristics include having "a common commitment" that allows for collective performance. Along with a common commitment, shared purpose and team "ownership" of that purpose was recognized as an essential ingredient of high-performance teams. The researchers also emphasized the importance of turning a shared purpose into specific performance goals towards team success. Specificity of performance goals, with clarity of purpose, are standard aspects of a Marine Corps mission order, but such clear goals

may become blurred in the chaotic environment of MOOTW.

Marine Corps small-units have inherent advantages in developing the characteristics Katzenbach and Smith define as important to team success. Their characteristics of *meaningful purpose*, *specific performance goals*, *common approach*, *complementary skills*, and *mutual accountability* have historically been trademarks of Marine warfighting units. However, the experiential data reveal that these characteristics of high-performance teams may be more difficult to develop for MOOTW vice traditional warfighting operations. For example, Marine units traditionally tasked to fight the nation's wars and defend American interests undoubtedly had little trouble finding a meaningful purpose in such a tasking. The MOOTW lessons learned, though, highlight the moral dilemmas individuals and small teams faced. Recall the moral dilemmas revealed in accounts from Somalia where young Marines and soldiers wondered why they were fighting the very people they had come to render humanitarian assistance. The moral ambiguity these MOOTW leaders felt can dilute in their minds any meaningful purpose in the overall mission, thus adversely affecting team effectiveness. Communicating the *meaningful purpose* characteristic becomes critical to team success in MOOTW.

Additionally, the *common approach* characteristic of a high-performance team becomes less clear in the complexity of MOOTW. Katzenbach and Smith term this common approach as "how team members will work together to accomplish their purpose." (p. 56) They further amplify this concept stating "agreeing on the specifics of work and how it fits together to integrate individual skills and advance team performance

lies at the heart of shaping a common approach.” (p. 56) Such agreement and integration among individuals can be more problematic in MOOTW where the mission tasks have been shown to be unexpected and non-traditional.

Marines train to common operating procedures for combat operations. Certainly much of this standard training is applied to MOOTW, but the lessons learned also revealed the need for adaptive, non-standard procedures based on the situation. For example, a machine gun team may know the division of labor and responsibility for operating that weapon system in combat, but may not be practiced in assigning responsibility and integrating individual skills for manning, securing and distributing supplies from a food distribution point to refugees. Such unforeseen and untrained for tasks were described throughout the experiential data. While “flexing” from standard procedures during operations occurs in both traditional warfighting and MOOTW, providing a common training approach to the diversity of situations and missions examined appears more difficult than standardizing training for traditional combat operations.

Providing a common approach for resettling refugees, providing humanitarian relief, or peacekeeping in diverse environments is clearly a difficult task. The lessons learned bore out the uniqueness of each mission based on environmental contexts. But finding a common approach for Marines to take towards developing teams for MOOTW is not impossible. The previous doctrinal examination pointed to *Warfighting* as the common mental model which Marines can use across the spectrum of conflict. Incorporating the demanded flexibility of judgement inherent in this mental model is

essential to providing a common approach both organizationally and within individual small teams. While this emphasis on flexibility in individual leadership is explicitly stated in Marine doctrine, such emphasis must also be applied to training and development of teams to ensure this flexibility of thought and action becomes inherent in a common approach to MOOTW.

Additionally, the study highlighted the necessity of developing the right mix of *complementary skills* within a team. A military unit's focus of effort is the development of individual and unit skills during training, but again the small-unit leader is often assigned to a unit where he has no say in determining the personnel who are a part of the team. Whereas corporate team leaders studied by Katzenbach and Smith could pick and choose personnel to create high-performance teams, small-unit leaders in the Marine Corps must work with and develop the personnel skills which are assigned to their unit. As such, the leadership development demands on these junior leaders are far greater than civilian counterparts.

Developing these complementary skills is also challenged by the diversity of leadership roles which must be played by Marines in MOOTW. The discussion of Quinn's framework, coupled with the experiential descriptions of these roles, emphasize the need for multi-skilled leaders. Therefore, not only must leaders develop complementary skills within their units, but also must develop the leadership skills within themselves exemplified in Quinn's competing values framework. The MOOTW environment requires that leaders develop in their teams complementary skills while simultaneously developing an individual's competing leadership roles.

Unit development of complementary skill sets can be best addressed by Marine Corps traditional task-organization for specific missions. However, the unpredictability and frequency of recent MOOTW has made planning and task-organizing for specific MOOTW a challenge. In combat operations, Marine units are task-organized based upon the acronym METT-TSL (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and fire support available, -time, space and logistics). Recent experiential lessons have revealed that the ideal task-organized force has not been available to use in MOOTW missions. Marine Corps forward-deployed units, especially the MEU(SOC)'s, have often been called upon to execute MOOTW without prior training or specific task-organization (RESTORE HOPE, PROVIDE COMFORT, SEA ANGEL, ALLIED GUARD, for example). Consequently, in the absence of specific task-organization, Marine units must develop the complementary skills within their subordinate teams while concurrently executing these complex missions.

The key to developing the necessary team characteristics when the immediate leader cannot choose the specific personnel (such as an infantry squad, fire-team, etc.) is to increase the flexibility and cross-training of all Marines. Indeed a lesson learned from JUST CAUSE addressed the need to develop training which can increase the flexibility of small-units as well as cross-training small-units to make them more self-sufficient. (Taw, 1996, p. 36) Such cross-training of roles and skills required by MOOTW is indicative of Quinn's concept of moving from *either/or* to *both/and* thinking to increase managerial performance. By developing complementary skills in small units, the team, as well as the

individual leaders, can move closer to Quinn's idea of both/and thinking about the competing demands of leadership in a complex environment.

Katzenbach and Smith's research yielded three categories of complementary skill requirements necessary for effective teams: (1) technical or functional expertise, (2) problem-solving and decision-making skills, and (3) interpersonal skills. Again the doctrinal examination and the lessons learned echoed the research of Katzenbach and Smith in the necessity of developing these skills within teams. While these categories seem rather obvious, Katzenbach and Smith noted that neglecting to find the proper mix of these skill requirements was a common failing among potential teams. The military applications of these results have obvious implications on commanders, trainers, and manpower planners who must form effective small teams to accomplish MOOTW missions. The experiential lessons recounted from RESTORE HOPE, JUST CAUSE and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY repeatedly discussed the necessity for small, flexible units as keys to mission success. Commanders, trainers and manpower planners are the ones with the authority to create and encourage complementary skill development within these small units.

Katzenbach and Smith incorporated the term *mutual accountability* in their definition of a team. Certainly this concept is easily identifiable in all Marine Corps units and teams. From the first day of training, Marines are ingrained with the concept of the individual being subordinated to the unit. While individuals are often held accountable for the actions of the unit, truly effective Marine leaders imbue this sense of collective responsibility and accountability within their units. Thus, Marine leadership development

practices have always focused on the concept of mutual accountability. This emphasis does not change in regards to MOOTW.

One last characteristic of effective teams noted by Katzenbach and Smith may not be as easily incorporated into military small-units. Their study revealed that establishing the proper size of the team is essential. They used the term "small number" in their definition of a team. They use "small number" as a pragmatic guide and define this term as a size of less than fifty, with the smaller the team often being the more effective. Of course, military units are often standard sized, and the small-unit leader may not have the necessary authority to determine his size requirements. So as with finding the complementary skill sets, determining an ideal size of the team may be more difficult for the small-unit MOOTW leader than the teams studied by Katzenbach and Smith. Consequently, the commanders and manpower planners who have such authority must determine the best way to establish teams for MOOTW missions.

Their study of high-performance teams is useful, then, in analyzing ways in which the Marine Corps can improve the development of the effective small-units so critical to MOOTW mission success. Applying the doctrinal examination and tactical lessons to their conclusions results in some areas in which the Corps can increase the effectiveness of small teams for MOOTW. These areas of emphasis are the characteristics of:

- Clearly defining the *meaningful purpose* of a MOOTW mission to reduce some of the moral dilemmas revealed in the tactical lessons. This meaningful purpose must be clearly understood at the lowest team levels as they often operate autonomously.
- Clarifying and training to a *common approach* to MOOTW missions. The sheer diversity of situations encountered by small teams in MOOTW make this developmental aspect very difficult.

- Developing *complementary skill* sets within standardized Marine Corps units which execute these “non-standard” military missions.

These characteristics of high-performance teams have certainly been hallmarks of Marine combat units during traditional warfighting missions. They can also be developed in small-units to maintain and increase effectiveness in the MOOTW environment.

3. Full Range of Leadership Model

Another theoretical framework that applies to the results of this research is Bernard Bass' (1998) *Full Range of Leadership* model. This model speculates about the military leadership requirements necessary in the future, with specific focus on MOOTW. Bass' model uses the theories of transformational and transactional leadership and their relationships. His theory explains “that leaders must mobilize their followers to go beyond their self-interests for the good of the group, organization, and society, while building self-esteem of the followers and keeping in mind their self-interests.” (*Military Review*, p. ?)

Bass uses a study he conducted for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Sciences (1997) entitled *Platoon Readiness as a Function of Transformational/Transactional Leadership, Squad Mores and Platoon Cultures* to derive the best fitting leadership model for effective platoon leaders and sergeants. This model includes the following transformational and transactional factors:

Transformational Factors:

- Inspirational Leadership: Trusted, valued leaders provide meaning and challenge, set examples and envision and articulate attractive goals and futures.
- Intellectual Stimulation: Leaders help followers become more innovative where appropriate.

- Individualized Consideration: Leaders attend to the individual needs of their followers as well as the needs of their units.

Transactional Factors:

- Contingent Reward: Leaders reward followers in exchange for followers carrying out their assignments.
- Active Management by Exception: Leaders monitor followers for deviations and errors and take corrective and disciplinary actions as needed.
- Passive Management: Leaders wait for problems to emerge before correcting or they avoid taking passive action. (*Military Review*, p. 2)

Bass' research has shown this model to have "accounted for effective leadership in the military and elsewhere." Bass' model has definite parallels to both Quinn and Katzenbach and Smith. The presence of these transformational factors within junior leaders would facilitate the developing the meaningful purpose, common approach and complementary skills discussed by Katzenbach and Smith. His model suggests that leaders with these transformational factors would consequently be more effective in developing the small, flexible, independent teams that the lessons learned indicated were required in MOOTW.

He then takes this research and postulates some of the challenges faced by "the geostrategic setting, its technology and art, as well as the organizational and human issues" the Army will face in 2025 to see if his model needs adjustment in leading in future conflicts. Of particular note to leading MOOTW missions in the future, Bass applies transformational/transactional model to "winning the peace" during MOOTW missions. He points out the different goals between warfighting and "peace winning" often associated with MOOTW missions. He states that:

The transformational/transactional profile of the most effective leaders in warfighting does not necessarily match the profile of the most effective leaders in "peace winning." Although transformational leadership will still be more effective than contingent reward, and active managing by exception will be more effective than passive leadership in both warfighting and peace winning, peace winning may call for more intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration; warfighting may place a greater premium on inspirational leadership and idealized influence. Contingent reward and management by exception may be reflected in different behaviors in warfighting and peace winning. (*Military Review*, 1998, p. 8)

His findings are in concert with the discussion of the shifting importance of leadership roles of innovator and broker in MOOTW illustrated in Quinn's competing values framework. Bass consequently adjusts his model to highlight the leadership skills especially critical to peace operations that are an integral part of the "Three Block War." He describes these leadership competencies as:

Individualized consideration is involved in taking special actions to deal with local feelings. Given wide media coverage, the actions may become the basis of a change of attitudes in a whole population. *Contingent reward* occurs in peace winning negotiation of rewards for compliance. *Management by exception* is required to win the peace. Order must be reestablished. Discipline must be maintained, but peace winning works best when it emphasizes the positive as in contingent reward and transformational leadership. (*Military Review*, 1998, p. 8)

Bass then points out that this model of leadership requirements is applicable for all leaders at all levels of command in MOOTW.

Preparation will be needed at all echelons for the different, sometimes opposite roles required. Instead of keeping one's head down and concealing one's presence in military conflicts, it will be necessary to learn to keep one's head up and to advertise one's presence as a peacekeeper. Overlearning these opposite skills will be required for the appropriate rapid reaction in either war or peace conditions. (p. 8)

In pointing out the different, sometimes conflicting, leadership roles required for the conflicts of the future, Bass' leadership model has additional similarities to Quinn's *competing values framework*. Section B of this chapter's discussion of Quinn pointed to the shifting of leadership roles along the vertical axis from control to flexibility. Bass also points out the need for MOOTW leaders to shift along Quinn's horizontal axis from internal focus to more externally focused during MOOTW such as peacekeeping.

The experiential data echoed Bass' and Quinn's ideas of shifting leadership roles during MOOTW. For example, the numerous accounts of the need for visible presence and negotiating skills during the operations examined reflect the need to view leader roles in MOOTW as unique. When Bass speaks of "overlearning" opposite skills, he mirrors Quinn's concept of the apparent contradictory leadership roles which he explicates in his framework. "Overlearning" these opposite skills may be the method junior leaders can use to move closer to Quinn's concept of *both/and thinking* of leadership roles.

The lessons learned again reflected the need to reconcile this perceived contradiction of leadership roles and skills in junior Marines. Recall Gen. Zinni's comment of "Always consider negotiations as a great alternative to violence." (Allard, 1995, p. 71) Certainly this choice represents a competing value for the junior Marine and is indicative of the differences Bass speaks of between winning the peace and winning the war.

C. SUMMARY

These three research frameworks for leadership and team effectiveness are useful to analyze and identify the effectiveness characteristics of the small-unit leaders and

teams that are the critical factors to overall success in a MOOTW mission. Based upon the military's view of the centrality of the individual rifleman and the small-unit in MOOTW, the review of these particular research studies yield some applicable lessons for the Marine Corps in preparing for military operations other than war.

First, by emphasizing a dynamic focus on managerial behavior roles the competing values model is especially salient to the MOOTW discussion. The doctrinal examination of MOOTW in Chapter II and the tactical lessons learned in Chapter IV resulted in a consensus on the chaotic environment of present and future military missions. The small-unit leader in today's Marine Corps must be trained and educated to operate in this environment. Quinn's model on the contingency approach toward leadership, with its dynamic focus, is a model for the numerous, seemingly contradictory roles that managers and leaders must play to be successful in such fluid environments.

Another important aspect of Quinn's framework on contingency leadership was the movement from *either/or* to *both/and* thinking about leadership roles. In future conflicts, no one approach to leadership can be effective due to the diverse situations in which military leaders will be operating. Quinn's idea that managers must avoid thinking that one role for a leader is "good" and another is "bad" is in line with the changing roles of leaders involved in the "Three Block War." The changing nature of the threat and mission scenarios may require leadership development to move farther from the *either/or* thinking to Quinn's *both/and* in terms of the role of a leader.

Quinn's framework is especially salient in dealing with perceived managerial paradoxes. The doctrinal examination and tactical lessons learned described numerous

contradictions and paradoxes— for example, negotiation versus violence, food provider versus combat infantryman, warfighter versus peacekeeper— faced by junior Marines. Recognizing and coping with these leadership paradoxes may be fundamentally difficult for junior leaders unless these seeming contradictory roles are made explicit and prepared for by the Marines who must exercise these roles. Quinn's competing values framework aids in clarifying and making explicit the sometimes paradoxical roles effective managers must play. Marine Corps trainers and educators can use such an approach in explicating the complex paradoxes of leadership in MOOTW to junior leaders.

The review of the research on high performance teams also has great utility in the MOOTW arena. The extensive body of academic research on the characteristics of effective and ineffective teams, exemplified by Katzenbach and Smith, can impact the way commanders, trainers, educators, and manpower planners in the Marine Corps apportion and allocate limited human resources to form the best performing teams for MOOTW. The environmental domain of MOOTW, with a myriad of actors impinging on the operation, requires the complementary skill sets discussed in this research.

Current small infantry units, for example, may not be established with this mix of skill sets in mind. Such units are established to be effective in large combat operations and may be able to be adjusted before entering a MOOTW environment. A recent National Defense University study (1993) emphasized the importance of these small infantry teams in these operations:

At the heart of this web of interaction stands the infantryman; in his humble way he is the key to its success. Much is required of him: if he behaves badly, overplays his hand, uses force indiscriminately, and fails to

win the confidence of the local people who constitute his environment, the viability of the peace process in his neighborhood will begin to erode. In this role he is more than a combat infantryman. He has to be able to move comfortably in an urban or rural environment, projecting an aura of goodwill and security to civilians he routinely meets, but at the same time, in an instant he must be able to protect himself or people in his care from a lethal attack. (P. 46)

The ideas resulting from effective team research can be used to improve the standard small infantry units to meet this challenge.

Integrating these two frameworks with Bass' *full range of leadership model*, then, results in the types of leadership roles, sometimes perceived as contradictory, revealed in the tactical lessons learned. The data described leadership roles such as negotiators, policemen, security guards, humanitarian workers, liaison officers as well as traditional warriors. Such descriptions indicate a greater emphasis on Quinn's roles of innovator and broker in MOOTW. These descriptions also point toward Bass' contention that leaders must be more externally focused. Again the lessons learned discussed the diversity of stakeholders— refugees, local officials, rival clan leaders, NGO workers, foreign military members, media and politicians— that only reinforce the increasing necessity of Marine leaders to move more towards the external focus of Quinn's framework.

Bass also talked of "overlearning" opposite skills by leaders for MOOTW which parallels Quinn's concepts of competing values and both/and thinking. Katzenbach and Smith also reflect Bass in this area by emphasizing developing complementary skills within teams. The operational lessons revealed that small-unit leaders in recent MOOTW had to not only be highly-skilled warfighters, but also logisticians, public relations experts, supporting arms coordinators, intelligence collectors, military policemen, and

cultural emissaries. These different, sometimes competing, skills must not only be developed individually but also collectively within the small units who are the linchpin to MOOTW success. Such is the challenge demonstrated in recent MOOTW.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. MOOTW CONTEXT

This research has resulted in specific data-based conclusions that must be considered in the MOOTW context. Consequently, the MOOTW context in which these conclusions are viewed must be clarified. This section discusses the context of MOOTW for the Marine Corps' junior leaders revealed through this study, followed by the specific conclusions reached by examining data generated to answer the research questions posed.

One theme this study emphasized is that the Marine Corps will continue to be heavily involved in MOOTW for the foreseeable future. The opinions of military leaders, analysts, and observers reflected in Chapter II's doctrinal examination expressed unanimity in MOOTW's relevance to all Marine units both today and in the future. Consequently, the Marine Corps must continue to explore methods to refine doctrine, organizational structure, training, education, and leader development to ensure effectiveness in these missions.

In particular, the doctrinal review emphasized the centrality and relevance of the junior Marine to success in these MOOTW. Because of this increasing criticality of junior leaders to overall operational and strategic effectiveness, leadership development strategies are vital to future success in MOOTW. Marine Corps ideas such as the "Three Block War" and "The Strategic Corporal" reflect this need to develop junior leaders for the challenges of future MOOTW environments.

Another contextual factor for junior leaders in MOOTW is that, while overlapping with many traditional warfighting tasks, these missions entail some unique characteristics

that require organizational attention. These characteristics, outlined in Chapter II, include: focus on deterring war and promoting peace rather than fighting and winning sustained, large-scale combat operations, permeation of political considerations at all levels of command, a decentralized environment for leader decision-making, and a diversity of “non-traditional” mission tasks.

General Zinni (1994), in an address on non-traditional military missions to the Armed Forces Staff College, summarizes both MOOTW distinctiveness and the inevitability of future MOOTW. His remarks are representative of a school of thought that MOOTW is distinctive from the “traditional” combat operations that have historically defined leadership development requirements. In discussing operations such as RESTORE HOPE and PROVIDE COMFORT, he states:

What I hope to have conveyed to you is that this kind of enterprise or operation is (1) remarkably different and (2) it is the wave of the future. If it's a new world out there, a new world disorder, and the disorder and the conflict is going to come from these kinds of things, not only internationally, but domestically: the Hurricane Hugos, the Hurricane Andrews, the LA riots, the floods, the fires, aging infrastructure that's falling apart, on flood plains, along physical faults in the earth that are going to crumble and destroy an economy that isn't there to repair it and fix it, a society that's in a form of malaise as a result, crime is rampant, and anarchy that we're on the verge of in places. The mission you and I get isn't two MRC's, and it isn't going off to fight the 'big one' nice and clean, and end it with some sanitary standoff weapons system that we can put through the porthole of a command bunker. It's going to be this kind of messy stuff. And you can't ignore it and you can't get away from it. And you are going to earn your paycheck in this. (Marine Corps University, *Perspectives on Warfighting Number Six*, 1998, p. 269-270)

This “new world disorder” is the context within which the Marine Corps' junior leaders must now be comfortable operating. The Appendix, while not all-inclusive of recent

Marine Corps MOOTW, provides further evidence of the distinctiveness and relevance of these non-traditional missions. These representative MOOTW demonstrate the diversity and frequency with which these missions have become the operating environment for today's junior Marine leaders.

In this context of MOOTW, lessons learned were examined at the small-unit, tactical level. This examination revealed numerous examples of tactical effectiveness within the diversity of MOOTW. However, this research also revealed that the Marine Corps can improve organizational effectiveness for future MOOTW. One means of improving this organizational effectiveness leads to the primary focus of this study: the need to develop small-unit leaders for the unique challenges of MOOTW. The doctrinal examination, the overview of preparation for war and MOOTW, and the tactical lessons learned all emphasized the importance of small-unit leaders to operational effectiveness. Inherent in the "Three Block War" metaphor are the flexibility and capability of junior leaders who are the key to MOOTW success. Thus, the recommendations in this chapter focus on the junior leaders who must operate in this distinctive MOOTW environment.

B. DATA-BASED CONCLUSIONS

In the context of this background analysis of MOOTW, specific conclusions and the doctrinally-based implications to small-unit leadership were derived by focusing on the research questions from Chapter I. The conclusions related to each research question are discussed below:

1. Primary Question

What are the leadership lessons learned from recent MOOTW that have

implications for the development of the future Marine Corps' junior leaders and the small units participating in these type operations?

The analysis of recent MOOTW lessons learned in Chapter IV focused at the small-unit, tactical level (company level leaders and below). This analysis of tactical lessons learned resulted in specific themes that have implications for junior leader development. These themes are:

- Developing a specific mindset for leadership roles during MOOTW. The required mindset is characterized by:
 - the necessity for restrained use of military force, recognizing the distinct moral dilemmas posed by MOOTW,
 - understanding the importance of winning the support of the local populace, and
 - preparing to use negotiating skills as an alternative to combat power
- Developing junior leaders' decision-making skills for the complex environment of MOOTW, which has the following distinctive characteristics:
 - compressed levels of war where tactical decisions have strategic implications
 - decision-making in disordered environments where combatants and non-combatants are often intermingled
 - political considerations that permeate decisions *at all levels of command*,
 - decisions made increasingly "far from the flagpole" and without the ability to consult higher headquarters, and
 - leader roles not simply involving the tactical employment of military force, but also non-traditional roles such as policeman, negotiator, humanitarian worker, mediator, and liaison officer
- Preparing junior leaders and small-units to act autonomously in a decentralized environment.

These thematic categories reflect the importance of junior leader development to overall operational and strategic success in MOOTW. The distinctive characteristics of MOOTW are also clearly indicative of a need to improve junior leader development in preparation for tasks not traditionally found in full-scale combat operations.

2. Secondary Questions

What are the unique leadership competencies and capabilities necessary for junior leaders and small-units to be successful in future MOOTW?

The doctrinal examination in Chapter II resulted in some specific conclusions on necessary leadership skills for future MOOTW leaders:

- The criticality and centrality of the small-unit leader to MOOTW success,
- The primacy of political considerations,
- The diverse types of mission tasks involved in the myriad of MOOTW, and
- A decision-making environment where junior leaders must exercise judgement in the absence of direct higher supervision.

Synthesizing these themes with the categories derived from the tactical lessons resulted in three key leadership competency areas:

- (1) ability to adapt leadership roles to diverse environments,
- (2) independent decision-making skills for decentralized operations, and
- (3) ability to develop leadership skills in team members.

These three key areas were used as a basis for selecting theoretical leadership development models to answer the question below.

Are there theoretical leadership development models which can be applied to Marine Corps development processes to help provide small-unit leaders with the necessary leadership competencies derived from operational experience?

Using the three key leadership competency areas resulting from the research, specific leader development models were analyzed for insight into MOOTW leadership. The three frameworks selected with particular relevance to these leadership competency areas were: (1) Quinn's (1988) *Competing Values Framework*, (2) Katzenbach and Smith's (1993) *The Wisdom of Teams*, and (3) Bass' (1998) *Full Range of Leadership*. The ideas contained in these leadership development models can provide insight into ways in which the MOOTW leadership competencies and capabilities can be cultivated in junior leaders. Moreover, these academic frameworks provide a different way in which small-unit leadership in MOOTW can be approached in the Marine Corps. Chapter V discusses in-depth some of these applicable insights. An overview follows.

Specifically, Quinn (1988) has four ideas in his leadership framework relevant to MOOTW leadership:

(1) *Clarifying perceptual bias*: Managers are often biased towards one leadership role over another. In MOOTW, with a diversity of leader roles, bias towards one role over another—say warfighter over negotiator—may negatively influence sound judgement and decision-making at the junior level. Awareness of such bias is the first necessary step to resolving that bias.

(2) *Making values explicit*: Seemingly opposite leadership roles are presented in Quinn's quadrant system to indicate that there is no assumed right answer or one best way to lead. Explicating the competing leadership values increases the leader's awareness of choosing an appropriate leadership strategy for specific situational characteristics. For example, leaders may situationally emphasize flexibility versus control or external focus

versus internal focus based on the environmental dynamics. Quinn's framework makes such situational leadership roles explicit.

(3) *Dynamic focus*: Quinn's framework indicates need for diverse behaviors from managers, showing that there are no clear maps for problem detection and solution in a complex, unstructured environment. This aspect of his framework has direct parallel to the decision-making environment of the "Three Block War," where as General Krulak (1998) notes "the rules are yet to be written."

(4) *Moving from either/or to both/and thinking*: This concept emphasizes not classifying leaders as having only one role or style of management. Rather, leaders must play many roles and employ varying styles depending on the leadership environment. Quin's *both/and thinking* is discussed further in the first recommendation.

Katzenbach and Smith's research on effective teams revealed these common characteristics of high performance teams: *meaningful purpose, specific performance goals, common approach, complementary skills, and mutual accountability*. The Marine Corps small-unit is traditionally strong in these characteristics, but communicating the meaningful purpose and common approach during MOOTW becomes increasingly important in developing the MOOTW mindset discussed in the tactical lessons learned.

Katzebach and Smith's research of high-performance teams is useful in analyzing ways in which the Marine Corps can improve the development of the effective small-units so critical to MOOTW mission success. Applying the doctrinal examination and tactical lessons to the researchers' conclusions results in some areas in which the Corps

can increase the effectiveness of small teams for MOOTW. These areas of improved effectiveness include:

- Clearly defining the *meaningful purpose* of a MOOTW mission to reduce some of the moral dilemmas revealed in the tactical lessons. This meaningful purpose must be clearly understood at the lowest team levels as they often operate autonomously.
- Clarifying and training to a *common approach* to MOOTW missions. The sheer diversity of situations encountered by small teams in MOOTW make this developmental aspect very difficult.
- Developing *complementary skill* sets within standardized Marine Corps units which execute these “non-standard” military missions. These complementary skill sets may be different than the warfighting skills developed within small units for traditional combat operations

Bass (1998) also had insights relevant to leader development for MOOTW. The major theme from his study echoed much of Quinn’s observations that the ability to manage different leader roles is key to managerial effectiveness. His idea of “overlearning” opposite skills in the warfighter for MOOTW is very similar to Quinn’s competing values and is exemplified by this statement in his study:

Preparation will be needed at all echelons for the different, sometimes opposite roles required. Instead of keeping one’s head down and concealing one’s presence in military conflicts, it will be necessary to learn to keep one’s head up and to advertise one’s presence as a peacekeeper. Overlearning these opposite skills will be required for the appropriate rapid reaction in either war or peace conditions. (p. 8)

These three frameworks thus provide insight into the skills– and how to develop these skills– necessary to develop the leadership competencies revealed in the tactical lessons learned.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THIS STUDY

1. **Emphasize the Both/And Nature of MOOTW and Warfighting Roles**

The overriding recommendation derived from this study is that the Marine Corps continue to think about MOOTW leadership as different from leadership in traditional warfare. The doctrinal examination and lessons learned emphasized the different, often termed "non-traditional" leadership roles required by these recent MOOTW. While *MCDP-1* emphasizes flexibility in the maneuver warfare mental model, the challenges of the "Three Block War" require further discrimination of the necessary leadership competencies for MOOTW. Marine Corps commanders, trainers and educators must continue to develop the capabilities of (1) ability to adapt leadership roles to diverse environments, (2) independent decision-making skills for decentralized operations, and (3) ability to develop leadership skills in team members and in junior leaders throughout their leadership development continuum.

Of course, the Marine Corps exists to fight and win the nation's wars, so the development of these MOOTW leadership competencies must occur concurrently with maintaining the Corps' traditional warfighting skills. This fact is the crux of the problem in developing leaders for all aspects of the "Three Block War." Quinn perhaps offers an approach to tackling this problem in his discussion of moving from *either/or* to *both/and* thinking of leader roles. Quinn believed that such a shift was fundamentally difficult for many managers. This difficulty may also be the case for junior Marine Corps leaders. For trained warfighters who devote the majority of their early careers to mastering warfighting specialties, it may be difficult to embrace the multiple, seemingly

contradictory, roles that MOOTW leadership requires. However, the lessons learned have revealed the necessity to prepare for these roles before being placed in the "Three Block War" in order to enhance mission effectiveness.

2. Focus on Decision-Making

Quinn's *both/and* concept is not only applicable to thinking about leadership roles but also can be used to develop individual warfighting skills while simultaneously developing the junior Marine's leadership critical to MOOTW success. This research has identified decision-making as the paramount skill a small-unit leader must possess in MOOTW. Junior Marines, be they machine gunners, artillerymen, or attack pilots, spend so much effort on the "nuts and bolts" of their warfare specialty that they may not have opportunity to also cultivate critical leadership skills such as decision-making. Emphasis must be given at all levels not to concentrate upon one skill set at the expense of the other.

This concept is not a radical departure for the Marine Corps. But training in decision-making for the complex environment of MOOTW needs to be made explicit and emphasized institutionally. General Krulak (1999) speaks of this institutionalizing of training decision-makers while concurrently training warfare specialists through what he refers to as repetitive skills training:

If we know that the effectiveness of intuitive decision-making is dependent upon experience, we must seek ways to give our Marines that experience. We should recognize decision-making as a vitally important combat skill and promote its development throughout our training curriculum, both in our formal schools' curriculums and in our local unit training programs. We must face the paradox that our least experienced leaders, those with the least skill in decision-making, will face the most

demanding decisions on the battlefield. Just as we expect a Marine to employ his weapon under combat duress, we must likewise demand that he employ his mind. In short, we must make intuitive decision-making an instinct, and this can only be accomplished through repetition. Training programs and curriculums should routinely make our Marines decide a course of action under cold, wet, noisy conditions while they are tired and hungry and as an instructor asks them "what are you going to do now Marine?" (*Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1999, p.20)

This type of training is essential to preparing junior Marines for the "Three Block War" and must become even more prevalent throughout the leadership development continuum.

Additionally, this training philosophy must not just be practiced on junior leaders, but these leaders must also be able to conduct this type training with their subordinates. The lessons learned revealed a rapidly decentralized environment in most MOOTW requiring autonomous action by the smallest units. Consequently, platoon leaders and squad leaders must not only take part in this type training but must also train fire teams and individual Marines in the same methods. Again, the individual rifleman may be the Marine who must make the critical decision which determines operational- or even strategic- success in this decentralized environment.

3. Incorporate More MOOTW Specific Training Programs

While not the focus of this research, Chapter III did identify MOOTW as being a relatively small part of formal school curricula, especially at the NCO level. The feasibility of implementing more MOOTW education into these curricula should be reviewed. Ideally, such MOOTW training in these formal schools would familiarize junior leaders with the leadership roles required by MOOTW and offer specialized

training scenarios incorporating the peculiarities of MOOTW revealed through recent experiential lessons. Balancing such additional specialized training with traditional requirements of NCO and junior officer schools is difficult, but methods to accomplish all training concurrently could be found.

Since the most Marine training and education is in the operational unit, not in formal schools, unit training programs should strive to provide more realistic, applicable leadership training for MOOTW. This MOOTW training would include the previously identified characteristics of: (1) highly politicized environment at all levels of command, (2) high ambiguity between combatants and non-combatants, (3) decision-making at the lowest tactical levels in a decentralized environment, (4) development of teams to operate autonomously in this decentralized environment, and (5) reinforcement that tactical decisions by junior leaders have operational and even strategic impact.

Technology can be leveraged to train for MOOTW specific tasks not easily replicated in traditional field training. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab is already involved in developing computer based simulations that enable junior leaders to exercise decision-making in MOOTW scenarios. Operational units can incorporate such MOOTW training in regular training schedules, vice training enroute to the latest crisis as was often identified in the experiential lessons.

4. MOOTW Leadership Development Process Improvement

Other recommendations derived from conclusions apply directly to improving leader development for the unique MOOTW environment. These leader development recommendations include:

- Helping junior leaders identify their decision biases, for example a bias towards military force versus negotiation.
- Building competencies in situational assessments to allow junior leaders experience in determining appropriate alternatives to varying situations.
- Developing should provide education as to the political consequences of tactical decisions.
- Focusing explicitly on defining the unique and complementary aspects of MOOTW and traditional combat environments and the respective leadership requirements.
- Emphasizing the multiple, non-traditional roles likely to be required of junior leaders in MOOTW.

The conclusions revealed these leadership development recommendations may improve organizational effectiveness for the environment of MOOTW without degrading, but rather enhancing, traditional combat effectiveness.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A first recommendation for further research would be to systematically assess the extent which the MOOTW leadership capabilities and competencies identified in this study are currently addressed in junior leaders' leadership development. While an overview of formal education for MOOTW was provided in Chapter III, it was beyond the scope of this research to examine leadership development processes beyond formal PME programs. It is important to determine what gaps exist between current leadership development processes and the MOOTW leadership skills revealed in this analysis of tactical lessons learned.

As decision-making skills were found to be the critical MOOTW leadership competency, a second recommendation would be to further research how critical decision-making skills are developed in humans. Additionally, this research could

determine whether educational methods, training programs, or systems exist that the Marine Corps could find useful in developing these skills in their small-unit leaders.

APPENDIX. RECENT MARINE CORPS MOOTW

The following examples emphasize the diversity of tasks and forces involved and the relevance of preparing for MOOTW:

1. *Combating Terrorism:* The Marine Corps maintains two standing organizational units with specific focus on terrorist attacks against United States interests. The Marine Corps maintains two Fleet Anti-terrorism Support Team (FAST) companies of specifically trained Marines. These companies are located on both coasts of the United States and can respond to terrorist actions worldwide. A second organization is the standing Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) which is trained in response to any chem-bio attack on U.S. interests. The threat of chem-bio attacks by terrorist organizations is widely regarded as the terrorist threat of the future.

2. *DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations:* In 1989 a standing joint task force, JTF-6, was established to provide counterdrug support along the Southwest border of the United States. (Joint Pub 3-07, III-3) Marine Corps aviation and ground units have been heavily involved during the 1990's in the surveillance of the Southwest border as an assistance to law enforcement agencies (LEA).

3. *Enforcement of Sanctions/MIO:* Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY beginning in 1993 was conducted in order to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions requiring that Haiti's democratically elected president be returned to office and the military junta that had replaced him be removed. (*Military Review*, July/August, 1997, p.1) Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) Caribbean was

established as part of this enforcement operation and found themselves conducting an amphibious landing at Cap-Haitien on 18 September 1993. (*Marine Corps Gazette*, July, 1995, p.55)

4. Enforcement of Exclusion Zones: Operation SOUTHERN WATCH was initiated in 1992 to enforce the "no-fly zones" in southern Iraq. Marine Corps aircrews have been patrolling this exclusion zone, among others, ever since.

5. Humanitarian Assistance: On 29-30 April 1991, a tropical cyclone devastated the coastal regions of Bangladesh. In response to this humanitarian disaster, a joint task force was established and Operation SEA ANGEL was launched to provide assistance. The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (5th MEB), enroute home from the Persian Gulf, was directed to proceed to the Bay of Bengal as part of the Joint Task Force to assist in the humanitarian effort. (*Marine Corps Gazette*, November, 1991, p. 89)

6. Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA): In response to the Los Angeles riots of April-May 1992, Marine Corps units were involved in civil disturbance operations in the city as part of Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTFLA). An additional example were the Marine Corps units who conducted disaster relief operations following Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii in 1992. (*Military Review*, Sep/Oct, 1996, p. 23)

7. Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency: On 18 December 1989, forces from the US Southern Command invaded Panama in order to support the deposed Panamanian president and depose Manuel Noriega. Marine Forces, including Task Force Semper Fidelis, were an integral part of Operation JUST CAUSE. Marine units continued involvement in the operation other than war in the subsequent Operation

PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama. (Rand, *Operation Just Cause*, 1996, p. 5-8)

8. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO): On 2 January 1991, during the height of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the U.S. Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance in the evacuation of personnel from the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu. Forces from the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade conducted Operation EASTERN EXIT, a long-range NEO, from amphibious shipping which resulted in the safe evacuation of the embassy. (*Marine Corps Gazette*, June, 1992, p. 75-80)

9. Strikes and Raids: A recent example of a Marine Corps raid operation was the successful recovery of a downed pilot on 8 June 1995 in Bosnia. In this operation, elements of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) conducted an amphibious raid into hostile territory in order to recover this downed American pilot.

These brief examples of Marine Corps involvement in the doctrinal types of MOOTW are illustrative of the wide array of mission profiles and responsibilities placed upon the individual Marines involved. Such operations are certainly indicative of the diversity of missions Marines must be prepared to execute in the future. Recent operational examples highlight the need for doctrine, education and training which prepares Marine leaders, in any occupational specialty, for the entire spectrum of conflict.

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